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[N]o area of state law is more important than the rules surrounding marriage
and divorce, and no area of law in the United States has changed more
rapidly. What has been called the no-fault revolution in divorce law and
practice was launched in California in the late 1960s after several decades
of pressure for change. Nationally, the shift from fault grounds to no-fault
as a basis for divorce happened quickly. Within five years after the California
law went into effect, most states adopted at least one no-fault ground, and
no other regime had [an] articulate defense in [the] legislative halls or in
the academy....
From the standard of legislative acceptance, the no-fault reforms were
a brilliant success. Whether these changes have also operated to the benefit
of the individuals and families at risk of divorce is a separate question.
Twenty years after the advent of no-fault, a chronically high rate of divorce
is connected to precarious economic status for many women and children.
The phrase "feminization of poverty" entered the American language in
the 1980's, and there is widespread suspicion that the changes in divorce
law either have placed the interests of women and children in jeopardy or
have failed to provide safeguards that domestic relations law can and should
establish.
-Franklin E. Zimring'
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges a research grant funded by the law firm of Hunton & Williams, Rich-
mond, Virginia. Any deficiencies in this article, however, are those of the author
alone.
1. Franklin E. Zimring, Forward, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS,
infra note 3, at vii.
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I. Introduction
Divorce reform in America, and in many other countries, is currently
at a crossroads.3 Prior to California's landmark 1969 no-fault divorce
legislation, a number of lawyers, jurists, sociologists, and legislators had
been dissatisfied with perceived defects in America's fault-based system
of divorce. They argued that divorce should not be based solely on tradi-
tional fault grounds such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion. 4 Instead, di-
vorce should be viewed as a regrettable, but necessary, legal definition
of a marital failure, where very often the factors leading to the marriage
breakdown were not all one-sided and based solely on the fault of one
guilty party, but they were also caused by the incompatibility and irrecon-
cilable differences of both spouses .5 Moreover, under a fault-based di-
vorce regime, a number of couples in unhappy marriages often would
have to fabricate various fault grounds for divorce and resort to perjury,
often with the assistance of their legal counsel 6 Wealthier Americans
increasingly utilized questionable 7 migratory divorces8 from sister state
2. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
(1989). See also Lynn Wardle, Coordinator, Special Symposium on International Mar-
riage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition in Argentina, Austria, Canada, England,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, the Netherlands, Russia, Sierra Leone,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Tunisia, 29 FAM. L.Q. 497 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium
on International Marriage and Divorce Regulation]; Annual Survey of Family Law
in: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, England, Germany,
Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Scotland, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, 33 U.
LOUSIVILLE J. FAM. L. 259 (1995) [hereinafter Annual Survey of International Family
Law].
3. See, e.g., DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herma Hill Kay, eds., 1990) [hereinafter DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS].
4. In addition to adultery, cruelty, and desertion fault grounds for divorce, a
number of states further expanded the statutory list of marital faults to include insanity,
conviction of a crime, and habitual drunkenness or drug addiction. See, e.g., JOSEPH
MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 264-92
(2d ed. 1931); CHARLES VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 70-71 (1932).
5. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage
Stability, 9 VAND. L. REv. 633 (1956). See also MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABIL-
ITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972).
6. See generally RHEINSTEIN, supra note 5. See also Walter Wadlington, Divorce
Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
7. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (refusing to recog-
nize an ex parte Nevada divorce and Nevada remarriage of North Carolina residents
based upon their sham domicile in Nevada). See also Thomas Reed Powell, And Repent
at Leisure: An Inquiry into the Unhappy Lot of Those Whom Nevada Hath Joined
Together and North Carolina Hath Put Asunder, 58 HARV. L. REv. 930 (1945).
8. See, e.g., W. Barton Leach, Divorce by Plane Ticket in the Affluent Society-
With a Side Order of Jurisprudence, 14 U. KAN. L. REV. 549 (1966); David P. Currie,
Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 26 (1966).
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"divorce mills" 9 or from various foreign countries that offered
"quickie" twenty-four hour divorces to American domiciliaries. 10 No-
fault divorce legislation in the United States, " therefore, was intended to
be a good faith remedy to many of these perceived evils and shortcomings
inherent in a fault-based divorce regime. 12
Yet this so-called no-fault divorce revolution over the past thirty
years has developed some very serious shortcomings of its own. In
addition to a soaring divorce rate in the 1970s, when no-fault divorce
was first introduced in most states,' 3 a disturbing number of courts
have failed to provide adequate financial protection to many women
and children of divorce. ' 4 Consequently, many children of divorce have
9. See generally NELSON M. BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DI-
VORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of
Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 661-62 (1984).
10. See, e.g., Comment, Mexican Divorces-A Survey, 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 449
(1965); Note, Isle of Hispaniola: American Divorce Haven?, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 198 (1973), and see Peter Nash Swisher, Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reap-
praisal, 21 J. FAM. L. 9,25 (1982-83) (stating that, with few exceptions, the overwhelm-
ing majority of American states will refuse to recognize a foreign divorce, regardless of
its purported validity in the nation awarding it, unless at least one of the spouses was a
good faith domiciliary in the foreign nation at the time the divorce was rendered).
11. Section 302(2) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that a
court shall enter a dissolution of marriage when the court finds that the marriage is
"irretrievably broken" if the finding is supported by evidence that: (1) the parties
have lived separate and apart for a period of more than 180 days preceding the com-
mencement of the proceeding; or (2) there is serious marital discord adversely affect-
ing the attitude of one or both of the parties toward the marriage. UNIF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT § 302, 9A U.L.A. 181 (1987).
Currently all fifty states have some sort of no-fault divorce alternative, either based
upon the parties' separation for a specified period of time, or based upon the parties'
irreconcilable differences or incompatibility. See generally Linda D. Elrod & Robert
G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of Welfare Reform, Child Support,
and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 807 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Norman B. Lichtenstein, Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of
Financial Resources at Divorce: A Farewell to Fault, 54 UMKC L. REv. 1 (1985);
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and
its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
13. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, divorces and annulments in
America from 1970 through 1980 rose from less than half a million divorces each
year to over one million divorces each year, a figure that has remained fairly constant
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. John Leland, Tightening the Knot, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
19, 1996, at 72; Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, 82 A.B.A.J. 50, 51
(April 1997) (citing similar statistics). See also HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 410 (2d ed. 1988) ("The social change of
greatest importance has been the sharp growth in the [American] divorce rate, which
reached its highest point in 1979, and which has fluctuated somewhat since then").
14. See, e.g., Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does
No-Fault Divorce MakeaDifference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (Fall 1980); James B. McLin-
don, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Chil-
dren, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 405 (1987) ("An end to the systemized impoverishment of
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suffered long-lasting psychological, as well as economic damage, re-
sulting from divorce. 5 Indeed, a number of commentators have con-
cluded that the no-fault divorce revolution in America "has failed." '
6
women and children by the divorce regime must be one of the foremost items on the
nation's new agenda").
See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEX-
PECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA (1985). Although the accuracy of Professor Weitzman's statistical studies
have been recently questioned, other studies, like Professor McLindon's, supra, have
corroborated this "feminization of poverty" resulting from divorce. According to
1996 data from the Social Science Research Council in New York City, a woman's
standard of living declines by 30% on average the first year after a divorce, while a
man's rises by 10%. Elizabeth Gleick, Hell Hath No Fury, TIME, Oct. 7, 1996, at
84.
15. See, e.g., JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 306 (1989)
(suggesting that the goal of the judicial process should be to "minimize the impact
of divorce on children and to preserve for children as much as possible the social,
economic, and emotional security that existed while their parents' marriage was in-
tact."). See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Vitz, Child Protective Divorce
Laws: A Response to the Effect of Parental Separation on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q.
327 (1983) ("Recent studies in the field of psychology have shown that parental
separation and divorce have substantial negative effects on children."); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Rational Decision-making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 29
(1990) ("There is substantial evidence that the process of going through their parents'
divorce and resulting changes in their lives are psychologically costly for most chil-
dren.")
Two-thirds of all divorces involve minor children, and according to Columbia
law professor Martha Fineman, author of The Illusion of Equality, the average
annual child support payment is only around $3,000. "Equality is being applied
with a vengeance against women," she says. "Assumptions are made about wom-
en's ability to earn wages that are unrealistic, given the discrimination and different
rates of pay." The trend toward joint custody can also impoverish an ex-wife,
since the father puts his money toward maintaining a separate household for the
kids, not toward supporting hers. The kids too get financially battered. Ultimately,
the average household income for children of divorce drops thirty percent while
the poverty rate for children living with single mothers is five times as high as
for those in intact families.
Gleick, supra note 14, at 84.
16. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A
REPORT TO THE NATION (1995) [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN AMERICA]:
The divorce revolution-the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a culture
of divorce and unwed parenthood-has failed. It has created terrible hardships
for children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver on its
promise of greater adult happiness. The time has come to shift the focus of national
attention from divorce to marriage and to rebuild a family culture based on enduring
marital relationships.
Making marriage in America stronger will require a fundamental shift in cultural
values and public policy. No one sector of society is responsible for the decline
of marriage. We are all part of the problem, and therefore we all must be part
of the solution. We must reclaim the ideal of marital permanence and recognize
that out-of-wedlock childbearing does harm. Our goal for the next generation
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These very serious and troubling problems inherent in a no-fault
divorce regime have generated a number of recent articles and trea-
tises arguing that fault factors may still serve a legitimate function
in no-fault divorces,m7 and a number of state legislatures currently
should be to increase the proportion of children who grow up with their two
married parents and decrease the proportion who do not ...
Id. at 1.
The Research Board of the Council on Families in America included Professors
David Popenoe, Rutgers University; Norval D. Glenn, University of Texas at Austin;
Samuel Preston, University of Pennsylvania; Ann Swidler, University of California,
Berkeley; and Arland Thornton, University of Michigan. Id. at 9.
17. See, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, No Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Truth
of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519, 553-554 (1994):
New challenges, at times, prompt old responses, and some have thought the
unthinkable, calling for a return of fault.. . . What is a legal reality in California,
as throughout America, is that naked divorce has gone too far. To some, the
astonishing suggestion that the concept of culpability might stage a comeback in
the divorce ring illustrates the fascinating contingency of history. Twentieth-
century legal culture has reached an impasse on divorce. A new legal and cultural
matrix must now emerge.
Id. See also J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND
LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1997); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-
Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994); Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable
Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV.
605 (1996); R. Michael Redman, Coming Down Hard on No-Fault, 10 FAM. ADVOC.
6 (1987); Harvey J. Golden & J. Michael Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability,
10 FAM. ADVOC. 11 (1987).
Professor Stephen D. Sugarman, a strong advocate of no-fault divorce, allows that
even if the decision to grant a divorce is not based on fault:
[T]he rules pertaining to financial rights (and the custody of children) could depend
upon marital conduct, as remains the case in some states and in other countries
today. Plainly, the rhetorical force of an attack on the California-style no-fault
system can be enhanced if set in the context of an innocent and a guilty spouse.
Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 3, at 136-37. Although Professor Sugarman does not
advocate a return to fault grounds in California, he nevertheless describes various
potential ways that fault or culpability might be reintroduced into divorce law. Id. In
many other states, however, fault need not be reintroduced, since fault factors on
divorce have never been totally abolished in these jurisdictions, and still continue to
serve a legitimate function and purpose. See, e.g., Annot., Fault as a Consideration
in Alimony, Spousal Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to a No-Fault
Divorce, 86 A.L.R. 3d 1116 (1978).
See also Scott, supra note 15; and Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the
Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 80:
In recent years, family law scholars and practitioners have raised serious questions
about the degree to which no-fault divorce laws have achieved their purpose and
whether no-fault divorce laws have caused specific unintended or underestimated
injuries to divorcing individuals, their families, and society. While this scholarship
has focused on specific flaws and facets of no-fault divorce, those specific problems
suggest the need to reexamine seriously the basic premises of contemporary no-
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are reassessing the role of fault in divorce.' 8 On the other hand, the
American Law Institute recently adopted a number of the proposed
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, which argue for the
fault divorce laws and the conundrum of modem divorce law-i.e., the conflicts
between policies to promote marriage stability and policies to alleviate distress
when marriages have failed, and the tensions between the goal of non-regulation
of private choices and regulation of the public consequences of those choices.
However, these fundamental issues have not received serious scholarly consider-
ation for nearly a quarter of a century.
See also Gatland, supra note 13, at 51-52.
William Galston, a former adviser to President Clinton who now directs the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland in College
Park posits that "we lurched as a nation from one fairly extreme system to one
that is pretty extreme, by national standards, on the other side. Some people are
arguing that there's a midpoint we missed."
18. See, e.g., John Leland, Tightening the Knot: Convinced that Single-parent
Families are Bad for Everyone, Some Lawmakers Want to End No-fault Divorce,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1996, at 72:
This week, possibly on Valentine's Day, Michigan state Rep. Jessie Dalman
expects to introduce a set of bills ending no-fault [divorce] for contested cases
involving children and pushing couples to undergo counseling before getting mar-
ried. Similar legislation is up for debate in Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Pennsyl-
vania and Virginia. Though none of the bills are yet near passage, the issue has
caught fire among feminists, religious groups, men's advocates, lawyers and the
Americans whose first marriage-up to half-are projected to end in divorce.
Id. See also Dana Milback, The Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce is Assailed in Michi-
gan, and Debate Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al; The Divorce Dilemma:
Most People Want Getting a Divorce to be Tougher, Except When the Failing Marriage
is Their Own, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at 58. Fault factors on
divorce were also discussed on ABC's World News Tonight with Peter Jennings on
February 14, 1996; and on a segment of CNN News on February 19, 1996. See also
Gleick, supra note 15, at 84:
The effects of marriage breakdowns on women and children have sparked the
current bipartisan movement to shore up the institution of marriage and put the
fault back in divorce. Two weeks ago, at a conference in Aspen, Colorado,
Republican virtuecrat Bill Bennett spoke at a seminar of investors and media
executives about the social scourge of divorce. "Don't just look at young black
men or at women on welfare", he said. "We've got to look at ourselves. The
middle class needs to set an example of standing by your family and your children
and your commitments." The Masters of the Universe, many sitting with second
or third wives, were visibly uncomfortable.
Bennett and others have been targeting no-fault divorce, in which one member
of the couple can choose to end the marriage without citing a specific factor, such
as adultery or desertion. Lawmakers in Michigan, which is at the forefront of
this movement, recently introduced bills to abolish no-fault divorce and put up
new barriers to both divorce and marriage. "Marriage is a commitment," says
Brian Willats, a spokesman for the Michigan Family Forum, which supports
premarital counseling. "It's not just notarized dating."
See also Gatland, supra note 13, at 52.
Legislative efforts to repeal no-fault divorce laws began a few years ago in the
nation's heartland. A package of bills sponsored by Rep. Jessie Dalman, R-Mich.,
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total abolition of all fault-based factors of marital dissolution or
divorce. '9
The purpose of this article is not to "turn back the clock" through
the rehabilitation of fault grounds as the sole means for securing a
divorce in America. 20 Rather, this article will explore the ways in which
in that state's Legislature called for a two-tier divorce structure that would prohibit
no-fault divorces in cases in which one spouse contests the divorce or that involve
minor children. Iowa followed with a bill to eliminate no-fault divorces.
Although both measures were swiftly defeated, they set off rumblings across
the country. During the past two years, legislators in Georgia, Illinois, Virginia,
Washington, and a handful of other states introduced bills to repeal or modify
no-fault divorce statutes.
If this media and legislative attention is any indication, fault-based divorce is once
again becoming a "hot" topic in American family law.
19. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, Feb. 14, 1997) [here-
inafter PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION LAW]. See also Ira Mark Ellman, The
Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARiz. ST. L.J. 773 (1996) [hereinafter
Fault in Modem Divorce Law].
The chief reporter for the PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION LAW is Professor
Ira Mark Ellman, who supports a purely financial and no-fault approach to spousal
support or alimony on divorce. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony,
77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989). However, Professor Ellman's Theory of Alimony article
has been criticized by other commentators for not recognizing important nonfinancial
losses on divorce as well. ProfessorJune Carbone, for example, faults Professor Ellman
for ignoring larger non-economic interests of society, including child rearing, married
women's participation in the work force, a return of appropriate benefits that the other
spouse retains on divorce, and sexual equality issues. See June Carbone, Economics,
Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv.
1463 (1990). Professor Ellman's Theory of Alimony article also has been criticized
by Professor Carl Schneider who, while praising Professor Ellman for attempting to
provide a coherent rationale for alimony, criticizes Ellman for his refusal to acknowl-
edge any moral discourse on the subject of awarding alimony. See Carl E. Schneider,
Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU. L. REv.
197. For a reply to such criticism, see Ira Mark Ellman, Should the Theory of Alimony
Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations?, 1991 BYU. L. REv. 259. A thoughtful
discussion and analysis of Professor Ellman's theory of alimony, and the response
from Professors Carbone and Schneider, is found in Morse, supra note 17. Morse
argues that fault also is a relevant nonfinancial factor that should be considered in
determining an alimony award.
20. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 17, at 137:
[T]he time has come to consider reforming the first generation of no-fault divorce
laws. It would be unrealistic and irresponsible to ignore the fundamental fallacies
and specific failures of the current generation of no-fault divorce laws. This does
not mean we should "turn the clock back" and reenact 1950's-era divorce laws.
But we should be unafraid to ask hard questions about the 1970's-era no-fault
divorce laws we have inherited. It is time to adopt a new generation of divorce
law reforms.
Some state legislatures have begun to reformulate their post no-fault divorce era statutes
to include various fault-based factors in determining spousal support awards on divorce,
the division of marital property, or both. See, e.g., Woodhouse, infra note 41.
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fault-based factors, when applied to serious or egregious marital mis-
conduct that significantly contributes to the marital breakdown, may
still be utilized in order to bring about enhanced social, economic, and
legal protection to spouses on divorce, while concurrently establishing
a greater sense of responsibility and accountability in marital relation-
ships.
H. Protecting Marital Rights and Obligations Under
American Family Law
One cannot adequately address divorce theory and practice in
America without first addressing the underlying social, economic, and
legal ramifications of marriage as one of the most important corner-
stones of our society. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, marriage
constitutes "the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution."
Therefore, marriage and its dissolution has always been subject to the
control of the state legislatures.2 1
A. The Traditional American Family
By the turn of the twentieth century, American and European legal
systems had come to share a common set of assumptions regarding
marriage and the traditional family unit as a basic social institution:
(1) marriage was a primary support institution and a decisive determi-
nant of the social, economic, and legal status of the spouses and children;
(2) marriage in principle was to last until the death of a spouse, and
21. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965):
Marriage is coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.
Marriage therefore is subject to constitutional protection from arbitrary state laws.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic
civil rights of man', fundamental to our very existence and survival"). See also Gatland,
supra note 13, at 51: " 'It is a legitimate state interest to define and protect the
institution of marriage,' says David Blankenhorn, president of the Institute for Ameri-
can Values, a nonpartisan think tank in New York City."
On an international level, the United Nations recognizes that the family "is the
natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society
and the State." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/8 10, Art. 6(3) (1984). See also Symposium on International Marriage and Divorce
Regulation, supra note 2; Annual Survey of International Family Law, supra note 2.
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would be terminated during the lives of the spouses only for serious
cause; (3) the community aspect of marriage and the family was to
be emphasized over the individualistic personalities of each member;
(4) within the family, the standard pattern of authority and role alloca-
tion was that the husband/father was predominant in decision making
and was to provide for the material needs of the family, while the wife/
mother cared for the household and the children; and (5) procreation
and child rearing were assumed to be major purposes of marriage.22
This traditional family ideal, however, is no longer the norm in
America, 3 and Professor Mary Ann Glendon has observed that the
notion is beginning to appear that now "the family exists for the benefit
of the individual rather than the individual existing for the benefit of
the family." 24
B. The Modem American Family
Many of these traditional assumptions regarding marriage and the
nuclear family25 are no longer the norm in America. The "two pay-
check" family is now the norm rather than the exception, and the
modern American family is now being redefined by gender-neutral
laws, new lifestyles, new realities, and new expectations .26 Neverthe-
less, although extraordinary changes have occurred within the Ameri-
can family structure during the past three decades, and although Ameri-
can family law is currently in a state of flux and transition,27 the
22. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW PROP-
ERTY 1-35 (1981) [hereinafter THE NEW FAMILY]. See also JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET
AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 1-17 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
FAMILY LAW].
23. See, e.g., Victoria Mikesell Mather, Evolution and Revolution in Family Law,
25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 405 (1993); Scott, supra note 15; Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985).
24. THE NEW FAMILY, supra note 22, at 33. See also infra notes 68-79.
25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (holding that old notions
that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essen-
tials" can no longer justify family laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, and
no longer "is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas"). See generally THE
NEW FAMILY, supra note 22. However, true gender equality in American family law
and social policy is not yet a reality. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Implementing
Equality, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 789; Martha L. Minow, Toward a History of Family
Law, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 819; June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking
Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Chance, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 953 (1991).
27. See generally UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 1-17 (analyzing
the current impact of traditional and nontraditional families on American society). See
also THE NEW FAMILY, supra note 22, passim.
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importance of marriage and the nuclear family relationship as an invalu-
able social and institutional structure remains undiminished. According
to Professor Walter Weyrauch:
A family based on formal marriage is still treated by the courts as the most
desirable and productive unit of society, although no longer necessarily the
most stable. . . . Procreation may still be a purpose of marriage, but other
forms of productiveness, for instance, the educational and financial advance-
ment of both spouses, not just of the husband, by joint effort are increasingly
recognized. The economics of marriage are thus given closer attention by
the parties than in the past, and marriage is beginning to acquire many of
the characteristics of a pooling of resources and becomes co-ownership in
present and future property similar to a business venture.
This egalitarian model of marriage, in accordance with the aspirations
of the women's movement, seems to be more acceptable today than older
conceptions in which one party, the husband, was seen as the dominant
force or master. In its apparent materialism it refutes the romantic ideal of
love, as if it were suspect as a cover for secret exploitation. One factor
aiding this evolution is the availability of existing supportive case law; for
example, past cases dealing with family-operated small businesses ...
The trend is toward giving a similarly favorable treatment to the wife as
a homemaker and mother, whether the courts refer to an implied contract,
partnership, or special equities.28
Other commentators have recognized that a traditional view of mar-
riage often tends to devalue homemaker services. These commentators
have further advocated the theory of a marital "economic partnership"
based upon a modified version of a business partnership model, bor-
rowing some fundamental tenets from community property law, in
order to further assure the equality of both spouses' economic rights
during marriage. 29 Thefeme sole estate and Married Women's Property
Acts also have been rediscovered and are increasingly utilized to pro-
28. Walter Otto Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415,421-
22 (1980). Professor Weyrauch's article also discusses the growth of informal marriages
in the United States as well as the changing role of formal marriages. Id. at 424-33.
See also Barbara Ann Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Property, Divorce and Death,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 45-53 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage:
The Solution to an Inefficient and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 558
(1974). Under this concept of marriage as an "economic partnership," the spouses
would be free to tailor their property or support rights by contract prior to marriage,
but otherwise the concept of a marital "economic partnership" acknowledges the equal
rights and obligations of both husbands and wives with respect to services, management,
property ownership, and creditors' rights during marriage. Id. at 587-88. Family roles
would be determined by the parties in accordance with their individual skills and
interests, placing minimum restrictions on individual freedom. Id. at 590-94. This
"economic partnership" marital model would thus allow married women to pursue
a career or other activities outside the home, while protecting those who opt for a
traditional role in the home or spend a portion of their lives rearing children. Id. at
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vide married women with further economic protection in the form of
a separate equitable estate.3°
In addition to its continuing social and economic value, marriage
and the nuclear family still have crucial implications on procreation
and child-rearing functions. Moreover, the recent academic support and
encouragement of nontraditional family arrangements 31 has generated a
high-level of reevaluation of the major premises underlying marriage,
resulting in a number of strong endorsements for a rededicated commit-
ment to strengthening marriage and the nuclear family. For example,
a 1991 report issued by the bipartisan National Commission on Children
concluded that: "Families formed by marriage, where two caring
adults are committed to one another and to their children, provide the
best environment for bringing children into the world and supporting
their growth and development.32
594. Other commentators have supported variations of this "economic partnership"
marital ideal. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Analysis, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1250 (1986); Marcia O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce,
61 N.D. L. REV. 225 (1985); Susan Westenberg Prager, Sharing Principles and the
Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977).
Other commentators, however, have criticized the "economic partnership" theory
of marriage since equating the family relationship to a business may stimulate marital
competition rather than marital sharing, and encourage people to view marriage only
in financial terms; or because a marital partnership theory allows too much judicial
discretion, and places insufficient value on the nonmonetary marital contributions
without promoting self-sufficiency after divorce. See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990);
Martha M. Fineman, supra note 26; Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Mar-
riage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REv. 689 (1990).
30. See generally Jack J. Rappeport, The Separate Equitable Estate and Restraints
on Anticipation, 11 MIAMI L.Q. 85 (1956). Some commentators have argued that these
gender-based laws protecting a woman's economic rights on marriage are constitution-
ally permissible since these remedial laws attempt to make amends for society's prior
unfavorable treatment of married women. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some
Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813,
825 (1978), where the author foresees a continued, but limited, use of benign sexual
classifications in American family law that would be justified as compensatory only
if adopted by the legislature for remedial reasons and remedial ends. But see also Leo
Kanowitz, Benign Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
1379 (1980), where the author argues that such gender-based remedial laws foster
sexual stereotyping and should be abrogated.
31. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
32. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC (1991). This study
stresses, what most Americans do not realize, that various public regulatory policies
actually discourage marriage. The most vivid examples of policies at odds with the
preservation of marriage and the family unit are: (1) the "marriage penalty" in income
tax law that, in effect, rewards people for living together instead of marrying; and
(2) the welfare system which, with few exceptions, applies only to unwed mothers,
and not to two-parent families. "In effect," the report states, "low income couples
who choose to marry are also forced to choose a much less secure life for their children."
HeinOnline  -- 31 Fam. L.Q. 279 1997-1998
280 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 2, Summer 1997
Another report issued by the centrist Progressive Policy Institute
argues that any new state or federal governmental programs for children
will be largely ineffective without strengthening the two-parent family.
This report criticizes both liberals and conservatives alike for failing
to adequately address the current strains on American family life:
Traditional conservative support of families is largely rhetorical. Their dis-
regard for the new economic realities engenders a policy of unresponsive
neglect-expressed, for example, in President Bush's misguided veto of
the Family Leave Act.33
Conversely, traditional liberals' unwillingness to acknowledge that intact
two-parent families are the most effective units for raising children has led
them into a series of policy cul-de-sacs .... Given all the money in the
world, government programs will not be able to instill self-esteem, good
study habits, advanced language skills, or sound moral values in children
as effectively as can strong families.34
These studies, among other recent studies, 35 emphasize that marriage
and the nuclear family structure still continue to play an important role
in present-day American society and should continue to function, and
be legally protected, as a valuable social and institutional ideal.36
The study calls on leaders in the public and private sectors to "make conscious efforts
to promote family values and to support the formation and functioning of healthy
families." Id.
33. This Act was later signed into law by President Clinton. See, e.g., Family
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (1993).
34. PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE REPORT, PUTTING CHILDREN FIRST: A PRO-
GRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE 1990s (1990). See also UNDERSTANDING FAMILY
LAW, supra note 22, at 6-10.
35. See, e.g., MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 16; DAVID BLANKENHORN,
FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995);
JUDITH WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY
LOVE LASTS (1995); CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE (Kingsley Davis, ed. 1985).
36. See generally MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 16, at 10-11:
More broadly, marriage has evolved in Western societies as a complex institution
containing at least five dimensions: natural, religious, economic, social, and legal.
First, marriage has long been viewed as a natural institution, meeting and
guiding the primary human inclinations toward sexual expression, reproduction,
and emotional intimacy....
Second, marriage is a sacramental institution, typically built on sacred promises
and overseen by religious communities. In most cultures, powerful religious sym-
bols and rites have sought to idealize and sanction the marital relationship.
Third, marriage is an economic institution, constituting a primary unit of eco-
nomic consumption, exchange, and production.
Fourth, marriage is a social institution, nurturing and socializing children and
regulating the behavior of both husbands and wives. It typically links together
two extended families, thus widening the network of support, resources, and
obligations available to help children and other vulnerable family members. From
this perspective, marriage as an institution can be seen as a seedbed of civic virtue,
perhaps society's most important contrivance for protecting child well-being,
turning children into good citizens, and fostering good behavior among adults.
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C. Criticism of Marriage and the Nuclear Family Ideal
and a Reasoned Response
Not all commentators agree with the assessment that marriage and
the nuclear family unit should continue to serve as a valuable social
and institutional ideal. Professor Majorie Schultz writes:
Marriage has undergone tremendous change in recent decades .... Only
a small percentage of American families still have all the characteristics
associated with the nuclear family ideal. In place of a single, socially ap-
proved ideal we have compelling demands for autonomy and privacy, and
multiple levels of intimacy: single parents, working wives, house husbands,
homosexual couples, living together arrangements without marriage, serial
marriage, and stepchildren. The changes are legion, and their message is
clear: the destruction of traditional marriage as the sole model for adult
intimacy is irreversible.37
Although the overwhelming majority of states continue to recognize
that marriage and the nuclear family still constitutes a fundamental
legal status based upon contract,38 a number of other commentators
have continued to question the legitimacy and utility of the state's regu-
lation of marriage in contemporary society. They have argued that the
Primarily for this reason, marriage is widely viewed in human societies as a
"social good" worthy of strong support.
Finally, due to the importance of each of these dimensions, marriage is also
a legal institution, protected and regulated by a body of law that governs entry
into the institution, exit from it, and expectations of behavior within it, including
an enumeration of the rights and duties that flow from the status of being married.
[T]he institution of marriage was designed less for the accommodation of adults
in love than for the proper functioning of society, especially regarding the care of
children. Indeed, marriage as an institution is historically based on a fundamental
realization-that all affective ties between men and women, no matter how biologi-
cally based they may be, are notoriously fragile and breakable. Because of this
fact, an important aspect of marriage, in both its legal and religious contexts, are
the vows of fidelity and permanence that are almost always a part of the wedding
ceremony. In large measure, these promises are designed to bind males to long-
term commitments in order to foster the social institution of fatherhood.
37. Marjorie Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State
Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 207 (1982). See also Minow, supra note 26; Martha
L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269
(1991); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family, "
26 GONZ. L. REv. 91 (1990-91); Martha L. Fineman, Intimacy Outside the Natural
Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955 (1991).
38. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)("Without a prior
judicial imprimatur, individuals may fully enter into and rescind commercial contracts,
for example, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant
for or dissolve marriage without state approval"). See also Sugarman, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 3, at 138 ("Marriage, at least in this century,
is typically said to be best understood as a status, rather than as a contractual relation-
ship. ")
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legal status of marriage has now become "obsolete" and "anachronis-
tic" in modern society, and the incidents of marriage, therefore, ought
to move from status to contract implications with a concurrent reduction
of emphasis in the state's regulation of marriage. For example, Profes-
sor Lenore Weitzman argues that:
Prospective spouses are neither informed of the terms of a [marriage] con-
tract, nor are they allowed any options about the terms.. . . However, our
society has undergone profound transformations in the past century, and
the long-standing legal structure of marriage may now be anachronistic.
The state's interest in preserving the traditional family may not be important
enough to offset new social and individual needs which require more flexibil-
ity and choice in family forms.3 9
Other feminist writers have argued for the "uncoupling" of marriage
and child rearing. For example, Professors June Carbone and Margaret
Brinig state that:
Both the liberal feminist and the cultural feminist agendas ultimately call
for uncoupling marriage and child rearing. For traditionalists, children were
what marriage was about, and the marital exchange of lifelong support for
lifelong services served to encourage women to undertake child rearing and
to lock both parents into traditional gender roles once the choice was made.
The liberal feminists now wish to release women from the primary child
rearing role altogether, and the cultural feminists seek to separate protection
for child rearing from the continuation of the marriage. The success of
either agenda may accelerate the existing trend away from the traditional
family, with more couples choosing not to have children, more children
being raised by single parents, and both men and women experiencing a
greater variety of parenting roles. 4°
On the other hand, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse believes
that:
Women's situation can and will be improved by a legal framework that
supports marriage (same sex as well as heterosexual), asks both partners
39. Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change,
A Proposal for Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 1169, 1170 (1974). See also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT:
SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW (1981). See also Moira Wright, Marriage: From
Status to Contract?, 13 ANGLO-AMERICAN L. REv. 17 (1984); Schultz, supra note
37; Keith G. McWalter, Comment, Marriage as a Contract: Toward a Functional
Redefinition of the Marital Status, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 607 (1973).
40. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 26, at 956. See also Martha Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, 46 MIAMI L. REV. 653, 664-65 (1992) (arguing that heterosexual
relationships should no longer be the basis for family law, and suggesting an increase
in public support for mothers and the disassociation of mothering from marriage). But
see also notes 32-36 supra, citing recent empirical studies that suggest otherwise.
Moreover, a small, but increasing number of fathers also are the primary caretakers
of their children. See Amy Saltzman, When Dads Stay Home, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Mar. 3, 1997), at 71-72.
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(not just women) to do their share of the nurture work, and expects both
to treat each other with respect and concern. As long as the law seeks to
bring both private and public responsibilities into play, it will have to grapple
with defining what conduct and what responsibilities trigger individual obli-
gations and claims.41
Apart from the fact that no American state42 or foreign country43 to
date has chosen to legislate itself out of the marriage regulation business,
Professor Weitzman's proposal to replace the legal status of marriage
with contractual alternatives is unrealistic for a number of other reasons.
First, most parties now possess various contractual rights to modify or
alter their statutory marital property and support rights in the form of
premarital44 or post-marital 45 agreements; and unmarried cohabiting
couples in many states may also contract for enumerated economic sup-
port and property rights by utilizing nonmarital agreements and other
equitable remedies.46 Second, if the parties were able to privately con-
tract free from all state regulation of marriage, what protection would
be afforded to prevent the possible exploitation of one of the contracting
41. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Katharine Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation:
The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L. J. 2525, 2564 (1994). See also
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Toward a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 245 (1990).
42. See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
43. See note 2, supra, and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Charles W. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 692 (1972); Homer Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REv.
141 (1979); Peter Nash Swisher, Divorce Planning in AntenuptialAgreements: Toward
a New Objectivity, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 175 (1979). See also THE UNIFORM PREMARI-
TAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1983).
45. See, e.g., SAMUEL GREEN & JOHN LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW
AGREEMENTS (1984); STEPHEN W. SCHLISSEL, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND MARI-
TAL CONTRACTS (1986); ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARA-
TION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS (1992 rev. ed.).
46. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979); Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d 1285
(N.M. 1983); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980); Watts v. Watts,
405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). See contra Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (111.
1979); Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977). See also MARITAL AND NONMARI-
TAL CONTRACTS: PREVENTATIVE LAW FOR THE FAMILY (Joan Krauskopf, ed., 1979).
See also Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements,
70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 209 (1986):
A more precise, restrictive definition of public policy interests and a more flexible,
goal-oriented approach to remedial questions would greatly increase the courts'
effectiveness in implementing the overarching public policy in this area: to allow
parties the maximum freedom to contract with assurance that courts will enforce
promises in accordance with the fairly and freely achieved mutual intent of the
parties.
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parties by the other contracting party? 47 Third, in spite of recent societal
developments involving alternative lifestyles and nontraditional fami-
lies, "a majority of Americans still marry in the traditional way and con-
tinue to regard marriage as the most important relationship in their
lives." ,4 Finally, recent empirical studies have reaffirmed that marriage
and the nuclear family ideal continues to serve a valuable social, eco-
49nomic, political, and legal function in contemporary American society.
Nevertheless, a number of scholars, academicians, and other com-
mentators have unrealistically ignored the continuing strength and via-
bility of marriage and the nuclear family in America as a valuable
social, economic, political, and legal institution.5 ° Likewise, a number
of conservative and liberal politicians who publicly espouse "family
47. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State, 62 VA. L. REv. 663,
666 (1976) ("If the state is in the process of divesting itself of its marriage regulation
business, then, of course, it is not likely to set up shop as an enforcer to heretofore
unenforceable contracts").
48. CLARK, supra note 13, at 26.
49. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. See also Gatland, supra note
13, at 54:
While they have reservations about peeling back no-fault divorce laws, lawyers
in domestic relations law, like legislators, have begun to think about how the
divorce process can be improved. The ABA Family Law Section, for instance,
has created a joint task force with the American Psychological Association to
study the issue.
Some lawyers believe the focus should be on how individuals and society treat
marriage. After all, only married couples face the problems of divorce.
50. See, e.g., MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 16, at 9:
Much of the scholarly discourse on family issues conducted over the past three
decades has contained a strong anti-marriage bias. Many textbooks written for
use in schools and colleges openly propagandize against any privileged cultural
status for marriage and quite often even against marriage itself.
For a non-academic view of this problem, see John Leo, On Society: Where Marriage
Is a Scary Word, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1996, at 22:
It's impossible to overestimate how deeply our intellectual and cultural elite is
implicated in the continuing decline of the American nuclear family. It's not just
the constant jeering at the intact family as an Ozzie and Harriet relic of the
Eisenhower era. It's the constant broadening of the definition of what a family
is (for example, a New Jersey judge said that six college kids on summer vacation
constituted a family) and the equally constant attempt to undermine policies that
might help the intact family survive.
Maggie Gallagher, in her forthcoming book, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE,
says that marriage "has been ruthlessly dismantled, piece by piece, under the
influence of those who. . . believed that the abolition of marriage was necessary
to advance human freedom." Demoted to one lifestyle among many, marriage
is no longer viewed by the elite as a crucial social institution but as a purely
private act. . . . Why? Probably because the group is committed to a nonjudg-
mental culture in which all relationships are equally valuable, endlessly negotiable
and disposable. So talk about marriage as a long-term serious commitment that
must be shored up or preferred over other "lifestyles" becomes dicey and embar-
rassing.
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values" as a high-profile campaign issue, in reality often treat marriage
and family values as a very low priority."
Professors Schultz and Weitzman, among many other contemporary
commentators, have documented the growth of nontraditional families
in America. 52 Nonmarital cohabitation, as an American social develop-
ment, has experienced a fivefold increase from 1970 to 1980," with
strong indications that this trend will continue in the future. 4 The status
of nontraditional families" in America, therefore, remains a legitimate
The next skirmish in this continuing war between the elite and non-elite world
views will be divorce reform. The elite will depict it as a punitive, backward,
religious attempt to lock people into bad marriages. But that's not it. The point
is that wide-open, anything-goes, no-fault divorce has unexpectedly created its
own accelerating culture of non-commitment. Under no-fault divorce, marriage
increasingly carries no more inherent social weight than a weekend fling to the
Bahamas. The goal is not to halt divorce, but to make it rarer by trying to restore
gravity to both marriage and separation. But given the attitudes of our elite, the
battle will be uphill all the way.
These concerns over the perceived weakening of the institution of marriage in
America appear to be shared by the public at large. For example, in a recent national
poll conducted by the University of Maryland National Opinion Research Center, 50%
of those polled said they wanted "tougher" divorce laws, and only 27 % percent wanted
"easier" divorce laws. However, most state legislatures have not yet responded to
these public concerns. See David Whitman, The Divorce Dilemma, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at 58.
51. See, e.g., Michael Hirsch, The Great Debunker: A Nobel-Bound Economist
Punctures the CW-and Not a Few Big-Name Washington Egos, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
4, 1996, at 40-41, 41:
[Stanford economist Paul] Krugman doesn't short-sell America's economic prob-
lems. He is alarmed at the country's widening income gap, for one .... "I'm
terrified of what's happening to our society," says Krugman. But the remedies
he would propose "mostly involve improving and strengthening exactly what
we're tearing apart-health care for our children, a decent education for poor
kids, things like the earned income tax credit." What he's after, he says, is a
sense of proportion. "If this administration would put a tenth as much of its
attention into trying to prevent a million kids from being thrown into poverty as
it did into extracting a few more exports from Japan, we'd all be better off."
52. See notes 37 and 39, supra, and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Marital Status and Living Arrangements, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 389
(1983).
54. See, e.g., Marital Status and Living Arrangements, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 445
(1990).
55. Nontraditional family law concepts may include: non-marital cohabitation,
domestic partnerships, same sex marriage, de facto marriage, marriage by estoppel,
paternity and legitimacy issues, single parent adoption, gay and lesbian adoption issues,
and sexual preference issues related to child custody determination on divorce. See,
e.g., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 10-11, 19-25. See also Rebecca
L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples
and the Evolving Definition of "Family," 29 J. FAM. L. 497 (1990-91); Note, Expan-
sion of the Term "Family" to Include Nontraditional Relationships, 20 MEMPHIS ST.
U. L. REv. 135 (1989).
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concern that must also be addressed by the state courts and legislatures.
Yet recognizing the needs and obligations of nontraditional families
does not necessarily require the wholesale destruction of marriage and
the nuclear family ideal, since American family law, in its present
evolutionary transition, is still able to address, rectify, and subsume
the legitimate concerns of Professors Schultz, Weitzman, and others,
without the necessity of declaring marriage and the traditional nuclear
family to be "obsolete" or "anachronistic."
For example, in addition to the contractual rights of unmarried cohab-
itants to define their mutual economic needs and obligations in nonmari-
tal contractual agreements,56 the status implications of heterosexual
or homosexual nonmarital cohabitation and domestic partnership law
increasingly have come to the forefront of American family law in the
form of: (1) domestic partnership ordinances that have been enacted
in a growing number of American cities57; (2) employment benefits
that a number of corporations have made available, not only to the
spouses of their employees, but also to unmarried cohabiting domestic
partners as well 58; and (3) workers' compensation awards and other
statutory remedies provided in a number of states to dependent unmar-
ried de facto spouses, as well as to married spouses .59 Although these
56. See note 46, supra. See also Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination
of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708 (1977); Kristin
Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v. Marvin to Same-Sex Couples: A Proposal for
a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract Statute, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029
(1992).
57. E.g., Berkeley, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, Califor-
nia; Tacoma Park, Maryland; New York, New York; Seattle, Washington; Madi-
son, Wisconsin. See generally Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (1991); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis ofDomestic Partnership Ordinances, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992). For example, New York City's Executive Order
123 states:
Domestic partners are two people, both of whom are eighteen years of age or
older and neither of whom is married, who have a close and committed personal
relationship involving shared responsibilities, who have lived together for a period
of one year or more on a continuous basis at the time of registration and who
have registered as domestic partners.
Berger, supra, at 424.
58. See, e.g., Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the
Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIo ST.
L.J. 1067 (1990). It is estimated that approximately one-half of Fortune 500 companies
now provide such employee benefits.
59. See, e.g., Kempf v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 580 P.2d 1032 (Or. Ct. App.
1978); West v. Marton Marlow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1975). See contra
Caudle-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixom, 260 S.E.2d 193 (Va. 1979). See generally SAMUEL
GREEN & JOHN LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS 158-210 (1984).
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modest initiatives have not yet enjoyed substantial support in a majority
of American states, they nevertheless constitute a first major step in
American family law of recognizing nonmarital cohabitation and do-
mestic partnership law as a legally protected status. 60
Another illustration of recognizing nontraditional domestic partner-
ships as a legally protected status, without diminishing the importance
of marriage and the nuclear family as the preferred form of cohabitation,
is found in the domestic relations laws of Sweden, Denmark, and Nor-
way. The Swedish government, for example, has adopted a realistic
approach that legally recognizes both marriage and nonmarital hetero-
sexual and homosexual cohabitation through alternative protective stat-
utes. These statutes provide legal recognition and protection to unmar-
ried cohabiting couples in durable, long-term relationships without
disturbing the position of marriage as the preferred form of cohabitation
in Sweden. 6' A statutory model based upon this Swedish legislation
may be beneficial to American state courts and legislatures in resolving
disputes between unmarried cohabitants without being limited to often
inadequate contractual remedies.62 Thus, the preferable approach for
American state legislatures and state courts would be to recognize and
protect the legal rights and obligations of both traditional and nontradi-
tional families as they currently coexist in contemporary American
society, by providing alternative legal rights and remedies for each
60. See generally Grace Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1125 (1981); Minow, supra note 37; John C. Beattie,
Comment, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protection
of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (1991).
The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Romer v. Evans, __ U.S. __ , 116
S. Ct. 1620 (1996), striking down Colorado's constitutional amendment barring legal
protections for gays and lesbians also has stirred controversy among legal scholars
and practitioners. Although some legal scholars, including Professor Lawrence Tribe
at Harvard University Law School, view the Colorado law as so odious that it violates
the U.S. Constitution per se. Other legal scholars, including Professor Michael McCon-
nell at the University of Chicago Law School, believe that the Supreme Court did not
adopt Professor Tribe's per se theory, but merely found that the Colorado constitutional
amendment failed to satisfy a rational basis test. See, e.g., Gay Rights Watershed?
Scholars Debate Whether Past and Future Cases will be Affected by Supreme Court's
Romer Decision, 82 A.B.A.J. 30 (July 1996).
61. See, e.g., Matthew Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish Legisla-
tion Grants Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24 FAM. L.Q. 179
(1990); D. Bradley, Unmarried Cohabitation in Sweden: A Renewed Social Institu-
tion?, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 300 (1990). See also Ake Saldeen, Sweden: Family Counsel-
ing, The Tortious Liability of Parents, and Homosexual Partnership, in Annual Survey
of International Family Law, supra note 2, at 513, 519-21.
62. See, e.g., Fawcett, supra note 61. See also Grace Blumberg, supra note 60,
where Professor Blumberg argues that a publicly created legal status is a much more
suitable vehicle for handling support and property claims of unmarried and married
cohabitants than is a contract theory.
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social structure according to the public policy of each state, as well
63as the present and future needs of its citizens.
Finally, those American commentators who may still question the
worth of marriage and the traditional nuclear family ideal might also
profit from the experience of various Marxist and former Marxist socie-
ties regarding their misguided approaches to marriage and the nuclear
family over the past seventy years. For example, the hope of the early
Soviet Communists was to weaken family ties and marital institutions,
which they perceived to be exploitive instruments by which the ruling
class maintained its economic and political power. Either spouse was
able to escape their marriage by a single ex parte application at a
registrar's office. In the alternative, it was not necessary to enter into
a formal marriage, since Soviet de facto cohabitation was also recog-
nized. However, subsequent Soviet legislation found it necessary to
restore state supervision over marriage and to put formidable obstacles
in the way of divorce. 64 A similar progression of events has been taking
place in other Marxist, and former Marxist, countries as well. 65
Thus, those Marxist societies that were once committed to radical
social change have been unable to alter the traditional family structure
significantly. 66 These failed social experiments further demonstrate the
remarkable resilience of the nuclear family, its invaluable role in the
raising and socialization of children, and providing for the economic
and social support of its members.67
63. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 5-17, 11.
64. See JOHN EEKELAAR, FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 20-23 (2d ed. 1984).
See also Olga A. Dyuzheva, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recog-
nition in Russia, in Symposium on International Marriage and Divorce Regulation,
supra note 2, at 645, 646-48.
65. See, e.g., Marta Soltesz, Hungary: Toward a Strengthening of Marriage, 26
J. FAM. L. 113 (1987-88); Michael Palmer, The People's Republic of China: New
Marriage Regulations, 26 J. FAM. L. 39 (1987-88); Valentina Zace, Albania: Family
Law Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in Annual Survey of International Family
Law, supra note 2, at 259: Miroslava Gec-Korosec & Vesna Rijavec, Slovenia:
Post-Independence Changes in Family Law Regulation, in Annual Survey of Interna-
tional Family Law, supra note 2, at 485.
66. See EEKELAAR, supra note 64, at 22: "There are striking similarities between
[the Eastern European experience] and the position into which modern Western family
law is moving." Query: Are Western European countries and the United States willing
to make these same mistakes?
67. See generally EEKELAAR, supra note 64. See also LAURENCE D. HOULGATE,
FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAW 49 (1988) (arguing that a
family finds its justification not only in its function of raising children and contributing
to the well-being of its members, but also in the benevolence and the psychological
satisfactions a family brings. Family law therefore finds its ultimate justification in
reducing the uncertainties and inequities that are associated with conjugal relationships
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D. Family Rights vs. Individual Rights
Traditionally, the American family has been highly valued as the
fundamental cornerstone of our society, 6s and state legislatures and
state courts were thus reluctant to intervene in family affairs on behalf
of individual family members. Two basic reasons have been suggested
for this traditional opposition to state intervention in family matters.
First, many courts perceived that such intervention would be ineffec-
tive. Second, the specter of governmental intrusion should not invade
the traditional right to family privacy, which had been so deeply in-
grained in American social and legal consciousness.69
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court held that marital privacy was a
constitutionally protected right in Griswold v. Connecticut,70 and this
new constitutional right to privacy rapidly became not just a family
right, but an individual right as well." Concurrently, the notion was
beginning to appear in American family law that now "the family exists
for the benefit of the individual, rather than the individual existing
for the benefit of the family.", 72 Thus, according to Professor Jane
Rutherford, despite the new commitment to the constitutional right to
privacy, individualism prevailed when individualism and family pri-
vacy conflicted, and the courts were increasingly willing to intrude on
marital privacy rights to further the goal of individual independence.73
Professor Carl Schneider agrees that the rise of individual legal rights
over family rights means that when the law makes moral decisions, it
now transfers them to individuals rather than to families, thus sustaining
the image of the family as a collection of discrete individuals rather
than as a unified family entity.74 Moreover, a major problem involved
with the fundamental right to privacy is that although most Americans
without rules, in establishing custody of children, in preventing harm to children, in
providing economic rights and obligations for family members, and in establishing
rules that will optimize human happiness within a family relationship).
68. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). See also notes 21-
36, supra, and accompanying text.
69. See Carl Schneider, supra note 23, at 1837-38.
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning a Connecticut
statute prohibiting contraceptives to married couples based upon a constitutional right
to marital privacy).
71. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing the right to
use contraceptives by unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(recognizing a woman's right to privacy of her body in making abortion decisions).
72. See THE NEw FAMILY, supra note 22, at 33.
73. Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights,
39 U. FLA. L. REv. 627, 636-37 (1987).
74. Schneider, supra note 23, at 1858.
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believe that this right should exist, they do not all agree on exactly what
should be included within this right. For example, Professor Robert
Mnookin gives the illustration that liberals generally consider sexuality
to be a private sphere, but view economics as a public sphere; whereas
conservatives believe in private economic enterprise, yet favor regula-
tion of such sexual matters as abortion and homosexuality.'-
In an attempt to incorporate and synthesize the traditional view of
family privacy rights with the more recent emphasis on individual
rights, Professor Rutherford persuasively argues for a new theory of
family rights. This theory recognizes: (1) that fundamental family
rights belong both to the family as a group and to each individual family
member; and (2) that when competing rights need to be accommo-
dated, the rights of the objectively weaker party should take priority
over the privacy rights of the family. These competing rights, however,
would only arise in an adversarial context against other family mem-
bers, other people, or the government.76 Thus, the modem American
family, as a viable legal entity, would continue to coexist with, and
nurture, its individual family members under mutually supportive legal
and constitutional safeguards.7 7 The alternative to a strong and viable
family structure7 8 may be grave. As Professor Laurence Tribe warns,
"Once the State, whether acting through its courts or otherwise, has
'liberated' the child-and the adult-from the shackles of such interme-
diate groups as the family, what is to defend the individual against the
combined tyranny of the State and [his or] her own alienation?"
79
III. Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce:
A Viable Concept in Contemporary American Family Law
A. General Introduction
Like marriage, divorce or dissolution of marriage in America has
always been regulated by the state legislatures.8° Since marriage and
the modern American family still serve a valuable social, legal, eco-
75. See generally Robert Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1430 (1982).
76. Rutherford, supra note 73, at 643-44.
77. See UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 181-83.
78. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
79. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 988 (1978).
80. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888):
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always
been subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which
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nomic, and institutional function, 8 the underlying public policy of most
states continues to promote marriage and discourage divorce unless
the parties comply with the required statutory guidelines for divorce.
82
Since the so-called no-fault divorce revolution, 83 a number of com-
mentators have largely discounted the role of fault in American divorce
proceedings. 84 However, these commentators make two serious errors
in assuming that fault is "no longer an issue" 85 in granting divorces
in America. First, "no-fault" remedial laws are seldom truly "no-
fault" in nature, and often incorporate fault exceptions to the general
rule for serious or egregious conduct. Second, a substantial number
of American jurisdictions still retain a number of fault grounds for
divorce, and a majority of jurisdictions still utilize various fault factors
in determining spousal support awards, the equitable distribution of
marital property on divorce, or both.
the parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute
marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights
of both ... and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.
See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
State, and not the laws of the United States"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
376 (1971), and see generally supra note 21 and accompanying text.
81. See generally supra notes 28-36, 67 and accompanying text.
82. For example, an overwhelming number of American courts still attempt to
validate parties' marital expectations whenever possible, through a number of presump-
tions in support of marriage, and through the recognition of certain defective marriages
in order to promote marriage in general. See, e.g., Leonard v. Leonard, 560 So. 2d
1080 (Ala. Ct. App. 1990); Panzer v. Panzer, 528 P.2d 888 (N.M. 1974). See also
Clark, supra note 48, at 70-75; UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at
26-29, 47; Annots. 34 A.L.R. 464 (1925) and 77 A.L.R. 729 (1932). See also Peter
Nash Swisher & Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29
FAM. L.Q. 409 (1995).
Divorce, on the other hand, is in derogation of the common law, and divorce statutes
therefore must be strictly complied with. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 299 S.E.2d
351 (Va. 1983). See also Clark, supra note 48, at 405-12; JOYCE GREEN ET AL.,
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 4-53 (1986).
83. See generally supra notes 4-16, and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 496:
Today the non-fault ground of marriage breakdown, incompatibility and living
separate and apart, have been enacted in almost all the states. It is thus fair to
say that there is now wide agreement that fault no longer should be relevant in
determining whether or not a marriage should be dissolved, even though the fault
grounds continue to exist in some states.
See also Norman B. Lichentstein, Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of Financial
Resources at Divorce: A Farewell to Fault, 54 UMKC L. REv. 1 (1985); Herma Hill
Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath,
56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
85. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 411.
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1. REMEDIAL "No FAULT" LAWS ARE SELDOM TRULY
"No FAULT" IN NATURE
Remedial "no-fault" legislation, whether it is applied to "no-fault"
automobile insurance, "no-fault" worker's compensation statutes,
"no-fault" strict products liability law, or "no-fault" divorce law, is
seldom truly "no-fault" in nature. Even though these remedial laws
attempt to provide certain economic benefits to an injured or wronged
party by partially alleviating the traditional burden of proof to demon-
strate the other party's fault or conduct, none of these remedial "no-
fault" laws totally abolishes or abrogates a defendant's responsibility
or accountability for his or her actions involving serious or egregious
conduct.
For example, although a majority of states have now adopted some
form of "no-fault" automobile insurance coverage for the benefit
of their citizens, these statutes are not completely "no-fault" in
nature. It is true that up to a specific statutory economic threshold,
which is often quite low, an insured automobile driver or passenger
cannot sue another driver for personal injury resulting from a motor
vehicle accident, and the injured party must look to his or her own
insurance company for compensation. However, statutorily pre-
scribed injuries are normally exempt from this "no-fault" cap,
including death, dismemberment, disfigurement, or the permanent
loss of a bodily function; and property damage very often is not
covered under "no-fault" automobile insurance.8 6 Indeed, some
commentators now refer to these "no-fault" automobile insurance
statutes as "partial-tort-exemption" statutes.87 Professor Stephen
Sugarman further points out that:
Even relatively pure no-fault accident compensation schemes still typically
recognize a residual role for fault in extreme cases. In worker's compensa-
tion, intentional self-injury, on one hand, bars worker claims, and especially
bad employer conduct, on the other, leads either to an enhanced compensa-
tion award or the right to sue in tort on top of the workers' compensation
award. Even in New Zealand, where accident law has essentially been
obliterated and replaced with a comprehensive accident victim compensation
86. See, e.g., EMERIC FISCHER & PETER SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
LAW 511-16 (2d ed. 1994); ROBERT KEETON & ALAN WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 410-25
(1988). See generally ROGER S. CLARK ET AL., NO-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1984).
87. See, e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 86, at 421-25. See also David D.
Caldwell, Note, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RUTGERS
L. REv. 910, 926 (1977) (pointing out that if the plaintiffs economic losses are greater
than the no-fault statutory benefits, then the plaintiff may recover the difference in a
tort action).
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plan, victims still retain the right to sue, in extraordinary cases, for punitive
damages.88
Moreover, in products liability litigation, the so-called "no-fault"
strict products liability remedies that have been embraced by the vast
majority of American jurisdictions 9 now approximate a negligence
foreseeability standard with regard to defective design and defective
warning cases, which constitute the vast majority of products liability
claims, and the conduct of the consumer in products liability cases is
always relevant. 90
Likewise, the so-called "no-fault" divorce laws in a substantial num-
ber of American states are not truly "no fault" in nature. 9' This may
88. Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 3, at 136, citing Jean C. Love, Punishment
and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability for Punitive Damages Under
No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U. C. DAVIS L. REv. 231 (1983).
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964), and see generally
Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (rev. ed. 1992).
90. See, e.g., James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263, 1315 (1991). See also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 593 (1980); James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265
(1990); Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform, 27 U. RICH. L. REV.
857 (1993). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1-20 (Proposed Draft 1996).
Thus, with recent legislative and judicial reform in defective design and defective
warning products liability cases, only defective manufacture claims now come under
the rubric of "true" strict liability in tort.
Moreover, the conduct of the consumer is still very relevant in "strict" products
liability law, embracing the doctrines of comparative fault, assumption of risk, and
unforeseeable product misuse by the consumer. See, e.g., HENRY WOODS, COMPARA-
TIVE FAULT § 1:11 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996). See also William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 535, 553-54 (1985) ("[D]esign defects typically involve durable goods, where
the likelihood of an accident depends both on the product's design and on the method
and intensity of consumer use. . . . [Thus], if we are right that many product accidents
that could be avoided by a different design are joint care situations, then negligence
is the more efficient rule than strict liability for design defects".).
91. See Morse, supra note 17, at 612:
Fault grounds for divorce and defenses remain important for a variety of reasons.
No-fault grounds have not replaced fault grounds in most states; instead they were
merely added as additional grounds for divorce. Fault is still a factor in awarding
spousal support or dividing marital assets in many states. In addition, this article
and some other commentators argue that fault still serves a worthwhile role in
some aspects of marital dissolution.
See also Elrod & Spector, supra note 11, at 804, 807 (reporting that approximately
thirty-two states currently retain various fault-based grounds for divorce, although
affording no-fault alternatives; and reporting that marital fault is still a relevant factor
in at least twenty-seven states for determining alimony or spousal support on divorce).
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be explained by the public policy rationale underlying divorce law in
a large number of American states that still takes into account the
responsibility and accountability 92 of the respective spouses on di-
vorce, 93 and which, in some ways, may be analogous to tort responsibil-
ity. As Professor Twila Perry observes:
It could easily be assumed that any analogy between tort law and divorce
would no longer be viable after the widespread enactment of no-fault di-
vorce. After all, a major purpose of no-fault was to remove from divorce
proceedings the whole issue of cruel, hurtful, or blameworthy behavior.
But the analogy to tort law still has potential to provide remedies to the
party suffering losses at the end of the marriage, if the idea of no-fault
divorce is brought more into sync with recent developments of tort law.
Approaches such as no-fault insurance and strict liability have eliminated
consideration of fault in certain areas of torts. They have focused, instead, on
rationales and mechanisms to compensate those who have suffered losses. 94
While this author seriously questions whether "no-fault" insurance
statutes and strict products liability tort laws actually have in fact elimi-
nated all consideration of fault,95 I do agree with Professor Perry's
92. The underlying concept of fault goes beyond moral "blame" and generally
encompasses a much greater sense of responsibility and accountability. WEBSTER'S
UNABRIDGED NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 668 (1968) defines fault as
"responsibility," "failure to do what is required," and "neglect of duty," and WEB-
STER's NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 452 (1991) defines fault as "responsibility
for wrongdoing or failure." Fault therefore encompasses concepts of responsibility
and accountability, going well beyond mere "blame." See also infra notes 93, 97-
99, 113-20 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Golden & Taylor, supra note 17: "Very few states totally ignore
fault [in divorce proceedings]. This is because we are brought up to believe that people
should be held accountable for their actions, and that courts should establish such
accountability and consider it." See also Morse, supra note 17, at 640-41:
The whole notion of fault proves to be a stumbling block for many scholars writing
about the current pursuit of equitable ways of dealing with alimony. However,
as noted earlier, fault provides an excellent tool to encourage the type of behavior
society believes to be appropriate in marriage, and to discourage that behavior
which society deems to be inappropriate. It seems that most people would at least
agree that engaging in adultery, cruelty, or desertion is not the sort of sharing
behavior which marriage should have to endure. In order to provide a disincentive
for such behavior, there should be concomitant post-divorce financial conse-
quences for engaging in inappropriate behavior.
See also a recent national opinion poll conducted by the University of Maryland
National Opinion Research Center indicating that an increasing number of Americans,
50% of those polled, think it should be "tougher" to divorce in America, while a
decreasing number of Americans, only 27% of those polled, think it should be "easier"
to divorce. See Whitman, supra note 50, at 58.
94. Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family
Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57 (1991).
95. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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assessment that a proper focus of divorce reform must be on promoting
a just compensation for marital loss. 96
Thus, no matter how various "no-fault" remedial laws may be de-
fined, and no matter how such laws may be characterized and formu-
lated-even with the best of intentions, nevertheless, based upon very
strong underlying Anglo-American legal precedent, social custom, and
state public policy, one is still held to be responsible and accountable
for one's actions.97 This underlying principle of an actor's legal and
96. See Perry, supra note 94, at 94: "Unless no-fault divorce is reconceptualized
so as to ensure [adequate] compensation to such spouses, what was hailed to be a
significant step forward in family law may prove to be, at best, little more than a
cosmetic change."
However, reconceptualizing and analogizing fault and no-fault divorce law compen-
sation theories to tort law compensation theory does not necessarily mandate that only
a tort law remedy is appropriate to compensate a spouse for nonfinancial loss on
divorce. See generally Section Ill.C.3. infra.
97. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-38, 37 (1923)
(observing that the various forms of legal liability started from a moral basis, and
from the concept that someone was legally responsible and accountable for his or her
conduct); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921)
(observing that "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards
of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of
the law"). So query: If a reasonable person of ordinary prudence is properly held
legally accountable and responsible for his or her actions in criminal law, tort law,
property law, and contract law, why not in family law as well? See infra notes 116-
20 and accompanying text.
See also Morse, supra note 17, at 641-42:
In tort, the law provides a remedy for intentional actions which cause harm,
negligent actions which result in harm, and even for some activities where no
proof of negligence is necessary, such as product liability. Only in the dissolution
of marriage does the law currently seem to ignore even the most egregious of
actions by a person toward his or her spouse and provide no compensation for
the action .... Marriage is the only relationship in which a party may blithely
wreak havoc upon another's life only to have the law shield the behavior through
no-fault divorce rather than deter the behavior as it did in the past. Where there
is fault, there should be consequence.
Even Professor Ellman initially concedes that:
[T]he thread of modern family law scholarship that looks fondly on the law's
role in vindicating moral values is naturally sympathetic to consideration of fault
[citing Schneider, supra notes 19 and 23 and MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 197 (1987)]. And indeed, on initial examination
at least, it may seem quite implausible to suggest that one spouse's claim to share
in the other's post-divorce income should be decided without regard to the spouses'
treatment of one another during marriage.
Fault in Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 775 & note 5.
Compare also Lynn W. Wardle, International Marriage and Divorce Regulation
and Recognition: A Survey, in International Marriage and Divorce Regulation, supra
note 2, at 497, 511:
One of the most interesting hybrid approaches [to divorce] is found in Canada
and England, where no-fault (breakdown) grounds are the only grounds for di-
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social responsibility and accountability to others therefore constitutes
a serious inherent flaw within any "no-fault" regime, and it is an
important reason why so many "no-fault" laws, including "no-fault"
divorce laws, often necessitate exclusions or exceptions to the general
rule for serious or egregious conduct.
2. FAULT REMAINS A FACTOR IN MANY AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS
A second serious oversight made by a number of legal commentators
and scholars in assessing the "no-fault" divorce revolution in America,
and divorce reform in general, is their surprising failure to recognize
and to adequately address the fact that, almost thirty years after the
"no-fault" divorce revolution, a substantial number of American states
still retain various fault grounds for divorce, and still utilize certain fault
factors in determining spousal support and determining the equitable
distribution of marital property on divorce. For example, as family law
practitioners Harvey L. Golden and J. Michael Taylor aptly observe:
Critics of the "fault" approach [to divorce] argue that without easy access
to divorce, the normal reaction to a miserable situation is not to do the best
you can to deal with it, but instead to remain miserable and make those around
you, including your children, miserable too. This is undoubtedly true in some
circumstances. Therefore, adding no-fault to the traditional grounds for di-
vorce is important as a safety valve because it allows an escape hatch from
marriages that were clearly a mistake or have become so.
These same critics, however, mistakenly believe that the adoption of
no-fault grounds by every state in the union heralds a beneficial end to the
fault system. This is simply not true because most states have incorporated
no-fault grounds into their traditional framework, not substituted one system
for another. At least thirty-eight out of fifty-three U.S. jurisdictions consider
fault in awarding divorce, property division, or alimony [citing as authority
Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States:
An Overview, 20 FAM. L.Q. 461-62, 483-84, 494-95 (1987)].
Even among jurisdictions that have adopted "pure" no-fault, some have
retained consideration of fault in property division and alimony. (Of seven-
teen state courts that considered whether fault should be a factor in property
division and alimony, eleven held it permissible and only six rejected it out-
right. See, Fault as a Consideration in Alimony, Spousal Support, or Property
Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d 1116.)
Very few states totally ignore fault. That is because we are brought up
to believe that people should be held accountable for their actions, and that
courts should establish such accountability and consider it. 98
vorce, but the breakdown of the marriage must be proved, and establishing what
traditionally were deemed fault grounds for divorce are among the acceptable
ways to prove the breakdown of the marriage.
98. Golden & Taylor, supra note 17, at 12. See also Woodhouse, supra note 17,
at 2531:
Although we live in a nation aptly characterized by Mary Ann Glendon as an
example of"no-fault, no-responsibility" divorce, reports of the death of fault have
been exaggerated. While we have been busy dissecting the no-fault revolution, the
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Thus, almost thirty years after the so-called no-fault divorce revolu-
tion began in America, a majority of American states still recognize
certain enumerated fault grounds as alternative grounds for divorce,
and even among those jurisdictions that have adopted "pure" or "true"
no-fault divorce grounds, a substantial number of states still retain
consideration of various fault factors in determining spousal support,
the division of marital property on divorce, or both. 99
B. Fault Factors Applied to Spousal Support and to Marital
Property Division Pursuant to a No-Fault Divorce
Although this article does not advocate a return to fault-based
divorce grounds as the sole means for securing a divorce in America,
based upon a number of underlying public policy arguments and
contemporary realities,,00 a major premise of this article is that fault
factors on divorce still serve a valuable purpose, and still constitute
a viable conceptual tool, in ascertaining spousal support rights and
obligations,10' and in ascertaining an equitable division of marital
property0 2 on divorce.
survival and evolution of fault has aroused relatively little comment. Although
half the states employ fault-based doctrines in one context or another, the use of
fault as an element in divorce is typically dismissed as contrary to the modem
trend. Many of the fault-based laws on alimony and property, however, are recent
reforms or amendments of earlier no-fault revolution statutes. Fault is neither as
outdated nor as invisible as we have made it seem.
99. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1978); Elrod & Spector, supra note
11, at 804 (listing approximately twenty-eight states where marital fault is still a relevant
factor in determining spousal support on divorce). See also Fault in Modem Divorce
Law, supra note 19, at 781-82; and Principles of Family Law Dissolution, supra note
19, at 50-51, both listing approximately thirty states where fault still plays at least
some role as a factor in determining spousal support, division of marital property, or
both, on divorce or dissolution of marriage.
What is significant regarding this state public policy recognition of fault-based factors
on divorce, is the fact that many fault-based factors affecting spousal support awards
and the division of marital property on divorce are recent reforms and amendments
to earlier no-fault statutes. See Woodhouse, supra note 41, at 278-79.
100. See generally supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
101. Spousal support or alimony on divorce is currently available in almost all
states by statutory authority. There is presently a great deal of controversy regarding the
utility and purpose, the incentives and disincentives, and the over-all characterization
of alimony in contemporary American divorce law. See, e.g., supra note 19 and
accompanying text. However, for the purpose of this article, I am assuming the continu-
ing viability of spousal support or alimony as an present-day economic factor in Ameri-
can divorce law.
102. In all states the division of marital or community property on divorce or
dissolution of marriage is recognized by statutory enactment. See generally OLDFATHER
ET AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY (1996 rev. ed.); JOHN
DEWITT GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION (1989); L. GOLDEN, EQUI-
TABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MARTIAL PROPERTY (1983).
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1. ARGUMENTS FOR REJECTING FAULT FACTORS IN NO-FAULT DIVORCES
A number of commentators and courts, however, have argued that
fault factors should no longer play any valid role in a "no-fault" divorce
regime. For example, Professor Norman Lichenstein summarizes the
argument in this way:
When a marital unit is split apart, the parties cannot expect to continue their
former lifestyle without change. Frequently, the economically less viable
spouse-usually the non-working wife with child care responsibilities-will
be particularly hard hit. The law should be designed to mitigate the financial
disruption of divorce and, to the extent possible, move a needy spouse toward
rehabilitation and financial independence. This requires a thorough economic
analysis of the financial contributions, resources, and needs of the parties. It
also requires bidding farewell to the distraction of trying to find the blamewor-
thy spouse and assigning a value to his or her misconduct.'03
Professor Ira Eliman likewise argues that fault factors no longer serve
any viable function in a marital dissolution action:
[T]he potentially valid functions of a fault principle are better served by
the tort and criminal law, and attempting to serve them through a [divorce
based] fault rule risks serious distortions in the resolution of the dissolution
action. One possible function of the fault rule, punishment for bad conduct,
is generally disavowed even by fault states. It is better left to criminal law,
which is designed to serve it, and in doing so appropriately reaches a much
narrower range of marital misconduct than do the marital misconduct rules
of fault states. The second possible function, compensation for the non-
financial losses imposed by the other spouse's battery or emotional abuse,
is better left to tort law ...
103. Lichtenstein, supra note 12, at 18. See also Donald C. Schiller, Fault Undercuts
Equity, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 14 (Fall 1987):
The reasons fault should not be considered in awarding maintenance are insepara-
bly intertwined with the reasons for no-fault grounds for divorce. The basic shift
from a fault system to a no-fault system was discussed by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in their Comments to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act. They stated, in part:
The traditional grounds for divorce, which assume that one party had been
at fault by committing an act giving rise to a cause of action for divorce,
are abolished. The legal assignment of blame is here replaced by a search
for the reality of the marital situation: Whether the marriage has ended in
fact.... When a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit,
the purposes of family life are no longer served and the divorce will be
permitted.
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 305 (1970).
The true reason a marriage ends usually bears no relationship to the grounds
for divorce. No-fault recognizes that marriages that are no longer viable should
be dissolved and that trying to fix blame for the failure serves no constructive
purpose.
Id. See also Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 291, 299 (1987).
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Where valid compensation claims arise, whether for physical violence
or emotional abuse, the tort law provides principles to measure and satisfy
them, and to determine when they are too stale to entertain. The property
allocation and alimony rules of the dissolution law, in contrast, are designed
for an entirely different purpose. In the dissolution of a short marriage, the
dominant principle is to return the spouses to the premarital situations. As
the marriage lengthens [the proposed ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution] provide increasingly generous remedies to the financially more
vulnerable spouse in recognition of their joint responsibility for the irrevers-
ible personal consequences that arise from investing many years in the
relationship .... 0
Accordingly, approximately eighteen states have now adopted a
"pure" or "true" "no-fault" divorce regime, where fault factors no
longer play any significant role in determining divorce grounds and
defenses, nor do fault factors play any significant role in determining
spousal support awards or the equitable distribution of marital property
on divorce.'0 5 For example, under California law, spousal support
awards and the division of the parties' property rights on the dissolution
of marriage are still addressed under state statutory authority, utilizing
104. Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28 Aliz.
ST. L.J. 773, 807-808 (1996).
105. Significantly, however, thirty years after the "no-fault divorce revolution,"
this is not a majority of American jurisdictions. According to a recent survey in the
Family Law Quarterly, no-fault divorce is the sole ground for divorce in only seventeen
jurisdictions: Arizona, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming. "Table 4: Grounds for Divorce and Residency Requirements,"
in Elrod & Spector, supra note 11, at 807.
Marital fault may not be considered in the award of alimony or spousal support
in twenty-four states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin. "Table 1: Alimony/Spousal Support Factors", in Elrod & Spector, supra note
11, at 804.
Professor Ira Ellman's own research lists twenty states that he categorizes as "com-
plete no-fault states" regarding marital property and alimony: Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Ellman, supra note 104, at 781. See also infra note 113.
Professor Elrod and Professor Ellman disagree on how to classify the following
states: Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming.
Thus, classification of states as "pure" or "true" no-fault states is an approximation.
Under either classification, however, they are still presently a minority of states.
Many no-fault states have adopted their relevant no-fault statutory language from
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-318,
-319 (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-10-113, -114 (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13 §§ 1512(c), 1513(a) (1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 para. 5-503 and -504 (1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58, 552 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-202, -203
(1996); WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.080, 26.09.090 (1996).
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concomitant judicial discretion of the trial court. Nevertheless, any
reference to the parties' martial fault has now been eliminated by state
statute. °6 Likewise, under Arizona law, fault cannot be an issue in
granting the dissolution of a marriage, nor can it be considered in
awarding spousal support or disposing of the parties' marital property,
unless there were excessive or abnormal expenditures, or the destruc-
tion, dissipation, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of marital
property.' °7 Other cases and statutes in "pure" or "true" no-fault
divorce jurisdictions are in accord with these general principles. 108
Thus, in the case of In re Koch,'09 the Oregon State Court of Appeals
rejected a wife's claim for spousal support based upon injuries sustained
by her in a physical confrontation with her husband. The court stated
that under Oregon law, fault could not be considered as a factor in
dividing the parties' marital property or in awarding spousal support,
so the wife's injuries resulting from her husband's physical violence
against her were relevant only insofar as they affected her employability
or her need for support."0 Two other "true" no-fault states also have
held that the murder or the attempted murder of one spouse by the
other spouse would have no effect whatsoever on the division of the
parties' marital property or any spousal support award, since these
awards under "true" no-fault divorce law must be based only on the
financial needs of the parties, regardless of fault."'
106. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rosan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972);
In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); In re Marriage
of Boseman, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§
2550, 2335.
107. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 526 P.2d 762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974);
Ivancovich v. Ivancovich, 540 P.2d 718 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). Such dissipation,
concealment, or destruction of marital assets is sometimes referred to as "economic
fault."
108. See, e.g., Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1982) (holding that
the court must set the amount of spousal support and maintenance without regard to mari-
tal misconduct by balancing the needs of the spouse receiving such maintenance against
the financial condition of the spouse providing it); In re Marriage of Tjaden, 199 N.W. 2d
475 (Iowa 1972) (reiterating that a "guilty party" concept must be eliminated as a factor
for divorce in Iowa, and any evidence placing the fault of the marriage breakdown on
either party must also be rejected as a factor in awarding a property settlement or an
allowance of alimony). See also Oberhansley v. Oberhansley, 798 P.2d 883 (Alaska,
1990); Heilman v. Heilman, 610 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992); Markham v. Markham,
909 P.2d 602 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996); R.E.G. v. L.M.G., 571 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991); Smith v. Smith, 847 P.2d 827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
109. 648 P.2d 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
110. 648 P.2d at 408.
111. See, e.g., Marriage of Cihak, 416 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981); Mosbarger
v. Mosbarger, 547 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989); De Castro v. De Castro, 334
So. 2d 834 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976). See contra the case authority cited in infra note 113.
HeinOnline  -- 31 Fam. L.Q. 300 1997-1998
Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce 301
2. ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING FAULT FACTORS IN NO-FAULT DIVORCES
However, a significant number of states, approximately thirty, have
rejected the rationale that fault factors should cease to play any role
in divorce or dissolution of marriage,"' and a majority of American
states to date, therefore continue to recognize that fault factors may
still play a viable role in determining spousal support awards on divorce,
or in determining the equitable distribution of marital property, even
though the parties may have utilized a no-fault ground for divorce."1
3
Attorney Adriaen Morse, Jr., notes that:
See also Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 2550:
My colleague, Professor Demie Kurz, interviewed 129 women of many races,
ages, and classes, investigating their stories about why their marriages ended for
her forthcoming book on divorce, For Richer, For Poorer. Over half of the women
in Kurz's study, and up to eighty percent of those in working class and lower
class marriages, told narratives of husbands who abused alcohol and drugs, slept
with other women, beat and raped their wives and children, and actually or con-
structively abandoned the home .... In the terminology of fault and no-fault,
the typical woman in Kurz's study stated a prima facie case for a fault-based
divorce .... How many of these women nevertheless see their marriages end
with a judgment that forces the sales of the home for "equitable" distribution
to their abusers?
112. See note 99 supra, and accompanying text.
113. Professor Ira Ellman observes that two categories of existing law, fault and
no-fault, are inadequate to describe the major variations of state legislative and judicial
policy relating to this subject. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19,
at 15-22; Fault in Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 776-84. Professor Ellman
therefore categorizes the states into five different groups:
Group I: Complete No-Fault Property and Alimony States (20): Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Washington, Wisconsin
Group II: No-Fault Property, Limited Fault Alimony States (5): Idaho, Ken-
tucky, New Jersey, Ohio, and Utah
Group I: Almost Complete No-Fault Property and Alimony States (3): Arkan-
sas, Kansas, and New York
Group IV: No-Fault Property and Full Fault Alimony States (7): Louisiana,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and West Vir-
ginia
Group V: Full-Fault Property and Alimony States (15): Alabama, Connecticut,
Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and
Wyoming
Id.
This is an impressive compilation of state law, and a realistic attempt to classify cur-
rent, though constantly changing, fault-based divorce law in approximately thirty states.
However, a few queries come to mind: First, if Arkansas is considered as an "almost
complete" no-fault state (or alternately a "fault" state involving egregious conduct?)
based upon the case of Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1986), where the Arkan-
sas court allowed an unequal division of marital property when a wife was convicted of
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The whole notion of fault proves to be a stumbling block for many scholars
writing about the current pursuit of equitable ways of dealing with alimony
[and the division of marital property on divorce]. But ... fault provides
an excellent tool to encourage the type of behavior society believes to be
appropriate in marriage, and to discourage that behavior which society
deems to be inappropriate. It seems that most people would at least agree
that engaging in adultery, cruelty, or desertion is not the sort of sharing
behavior which marriage should endure. In order to provide a disincentive
for such behavior, there should be concomitant post-divorce financial conse-
quences for engaging in inappropriate behavior.
1 4
Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse further analyzes the issue of
fault factors on divorce from a feminist perspective:
No-fault divorce is not a natural law, like gravity. It is a legal construct,
purposefully designed by lawyers for lawyers. Its primary impetus was to
manage exit from the legal status of marriage more efficiently and to spare
those in the system from involvement in the costly process and sordid details
of assessing blame for a marriage's death. [But] [i]n attempting to operate
only on hard data, translated as dollar figures for direct economic loss,
modem divorce reform seems to say that what cannot be measured as damage
to a tangible property interest does not count ...
We should construct instead a scheme that reclaims the power of fault
and that attributes consequences to good and bad conduct within marriage.
When the imbalances are striking, we should reward family-centric, caring
conduct, rather than turn a blind eye to abuse and exploitation. There are
conspiring to kill her husband, why shouldn't Wisconsin also be categorized in this same
group of states based upon In re Marriage of Brabec, 510 N.W.2d 752 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993), where the court held that marital fault might still be considered as a factor when
a wife was convicted of attempting to kill her husband in a murder-for-hire scheme during
the pendency of their divorce proceedings? See also In re Marriage of Sommers, 792
P.2d 1005 (Kan. 1990) (marital fault may be considered in "extremely gross and rare
situations"); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (N.Y. 1985) (marital fault is ex-
cluded from consideration in equitable distribution awards except for "egregious cases
that shock the conscience"). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 782.5, 4324 (barring any
award of spousal support, insurance benefits, or pension benefits to a spouse convicted
of attempting to murder the other spouse).
Professor Ellman also characterizes Virginia as a "No-Fault Property, Full Fault
Alimony" state, apparently relying on the cases of Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833
(Va. Ct. App. 1988), and Gamer v. Garner, 429 S.E.2d 618 (Va. Ct. App. 1993),
both suggesting that only "economic fault" such as waste or dissipation of assets
should affect the division of marital property on divorce. However, in the subsequent
case of O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1995), an unequal
division of marital property favoring the wife and based upon the husband's long-term
adulterous affairs during the marriage was affirmed on appeal. So one may still quibble
as to exactly where a state ought to fit within one of Professor Ellman's five categories.
Nevertheless, approximately thirty states, although in varying degrees, do in fact take
fault factors into account in determining spousal support on divorce, in determining
the equitable distribution of marital property on divorce, or both.
114. Morse, supra note 17, at 640-41. See also supra notes 80-99, and accompa-
nying text.
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many good reasons for harboring a healthy fear of fault. But if we suppress
all discourse on badness in marriage, how can we talk persuasively about
goodness? Is fault really so dangerous to feminists that we prefer silence?" 5
Accordingly, a significant number of American state courts and state
legislatures still recognize the viable role that fault factors continue to
play in divorce or dissolution of marriage, even when the parties may
employ no-fault divorce grounds for dissolving their marriage. One ra-
tionale for utilizing fault as a relevant factor in determining spousal sup-
port or marital property division is that divorce or dissolution of marriage
is essentially an equitable proceeding, and therefore the conduct of the
parties is always relevant as a source of compensation for harm caused by
the conduct of the other spouse. " 6 For example, in the case of Robinson v.
Robinson, 117 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a spouse "whose
conduct has contributed substantially to the breakdown of the marriage
should not expect to receive financial kudos for his or her miscon-
duct." ,1 A majority of American states by statutory" 9 andjudicial 20 au-
thority, therefore continue to recognize that fault factors may still serve a
legitimate purpose in determining spousal support awards, the equitable
distribution of marital property on divorce, or both.
The most recent, and the most comprehensive, attack on fault-based
factors relating to spousal support awards and the division of marital
115. Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 2567.
116. See, e.g., Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that a divorce case is equitable in nature, and a court of equity molds its relief according
to the character of the case; therefore, in awarding alimony in a divorce action, a
court may consider a party's fault in causing the divorce); Robinson v. Robinson, 444
A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982) (similar holding). See also supra notes 91-93, 97-99, and
accompanying text.
117. 444 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982).
118. Robinson, 444 A.2d at 236. Professor Ellman opines that the Robinson case
is one example of this fault-based rationale where fault is utilized as a source of
compensation for the substantial harm caused by the wrongful conduct of a spouse.
See Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 27 n.35.
119. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (1994); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 8-205, -206
(1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. § 208-34 (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 458:19 (1992); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-
5-169 16.1 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.1 (Michie 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 3.63 (West 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. § 751 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-5(7)(b) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -107.3 (Michie 1995).
120. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Daugherty, 606 So. 2d 157 (Ala. Ct. App. 1992);
Bieluch v. Bieluch, 462 A.2d 1060 (Corm. 1983); Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d
272 (Ga. 1976); Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Lagars v. Lagars,
491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Francis v. Francis, 823 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Perlberger v. Perlberger,
626 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Endy v. Endy, 603 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); Williams v. Williams, 415 S.E.2d 252 (Va. 1992); Dumell v. Durnell, 460
S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1995).
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property on divorce comes from the American Law Institute's Princi-
ples of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions. ' 2' These proposed Principles, largely drafted by the Chief Re-
porter Ira Mark Ellman, 22 forcefully argue for the establishment of
"consistent and predictable" principles relating to compensatory spou-
sal payments and the division of property on divorce, solely based upon
no-fault financial principles and objectives, to the exclusion of any
nonfinancial fault-based factors, such as marital misconduct. Although
these Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution appear to constitute
an impressive and comprehensive approach to achieve an equitable
sharing of loss from divorce or dissolution of marriage, and although
this author supports many of these proposals and objectives relating
to financial loss, nevertheless Professor Ellman makes some troubling
assumptions, and some questionable and largely unsupported assertions
in the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution regarding the role
of fault in determining spousal support awards and the division of
marital property on divorce, that will be more fully addressed below. 1
23
C. Arguments for Retaining Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce
Part I of the American Law Institute's Proposed Final Draft of its
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommen-
dations (February 14, 1997) is a comprehensive, 406-page discussion
of recommended family law principles covering the subjects of division
of property upon dissolution of marriage and compensatory spousal
support payments. 24 A comprehensive analysis of these Principles,
including those that seek to allocate financial loss arising from the
dissolution of marriage, are beyond the scope of this article. However,
this article will respond to some rather troubling assumptions and
largely unsupported assertions made by Professor Ellman in Topic Two
of the Principles of Family Dissolution Law entitled "The Relevance
of Marital Misconduct in Property Allocations and Awards of Compen-
satory Payments. 
' 125
First, it is important to note that this particular ALI project "is not
a Restatement but Principles" that "gives greater weight to emerging
legal concepts than does a Restatement," 126 and which parenthetically
121. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
122. See also Fault in Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, which reemphasizes
and expands upon Professor Ellman's argument against utilizing any fault-based factors
in determining spousal support and marital property rights on divorce.
123. See generally Section 11C. 1-3 infra.
124. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19.
125. Id. at 14-74.
126. Id. at xiii.
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recognizes that a substantial number of American states have not
adopted a "true" no-fault divorce regime that would make it a true
restatement of American family law. 127 Professor Ellman, as the proj-
ect's chief reporter, was responsible for drafting this portion of the
Principles of Family Dissolution Law with contributions from other
enumerated advisers and a members' consultative group. 128 Professor
Ellman reports that in a divided vote the Institute's Council endorsed
the chief reporter's no-fault treatment of both property allocation and
compensatory spousal payments on divorce, and the Principles of Fam-
ily Dissolution Law were then provisionally approved by the member-
ship of the American Law Institute in May 1996, after the defeat of
two separate motions to restore a consideration of fault.
129
Professor Ellman totally rejects the application of any fault-based
non-economic factors in determining the allocation of marital property
rights and compensatory spousal support awards based upon three major
premises: (1) utilizing fault factors "as an agent of morality" in effect
"rewards virtue and punishes sin"; (2) judicial discretion is "inher-
ently limitless" if no finding of economic harm to the claimant is re-
quired to justify such an award or its amount; and (3) compensation
for serious harm caused by the wrongful conduct of a spouse is better
left to a separate tort remedy rather than a concomitant fault-based
divorce remedy.
1. UTILIZING FAULT FACTORS "AS AN AGENT OF MORALITY" IN EFFECT
"REWARDS VIRTUE AND PUNISHES SIN"
Professor Ellman initially posits that:
Punishing the wrongdoer has been a persistent but troubled theme in the
law of fault states. Punishment is more usually the function of the criminal
law. The use of tort law for this purpose, through punitive damage awards,
is often controversial, particularly if the plaintiff has suffered relatively
little harm. The punitive use of matrimonial law is yet more problematic. It
is thus not surprising that even in fault states, punitive awards are ordinarily
condemned-when they are recognized as such ... "0
Some courts appeal to a rationale that seems at first to avoid the punitive
nature of a fault award by casting it as compensation for the financial
127. See notes 116-20, supra, and accompanying text.
128. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at xv. It is unfortunate
that none of these enumerated advisers or members of the Consultative Group included
any commentators who have been critical of a "true" no-fault financial loss divorce
approach. Id. at v-vi, ix-xi. See generally supra notes 17 and 19, and the articles cited
therein. Obviously, not everyone can serve on such an advisory board, but diversity of
opinion still serves a worthwhile function.
129. Fault in Modern Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 776.
130. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 23.
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costs of splitting one household in two, costs that necessarily arise in
most dissolutions. These courts argue that a fault-based award is justified
because it allocates more of those costs to the spouse whose conduct
caused them, by causing the dissolution. Framing the rule in this way
thus casts it as compensation rather than punishment even though no
losses are identified beyond the financial consequences present in nearly
every dissolution .... "'
In sum, courts that purport to allocate the unavoidable costs of dissolution
by assessing the cause of the marital failure are in fact rewarding virtue
and punishing sin."'
Professor Ellman's attempt to recharacterize marital fault in tort and
criminal law terminology, however, is doubly inappropriate since the
underlying concept of fault based upon serious marital misconduct has
long been recognized as an important principle in American family
law, separate and apart from any tort law or criminal law remedy."'
Moreover, the fact that a number of "true" no-fault divorce jurisdic-
tions have seen fit to abolish all fault factors on divorce or dissolution
of marriage by state statutory enactment' does not negate in any way
the continuing viability and recognition of marital fault factors in a
substantial number of other jurisdictions. 135 Thus, despite Professor
Ellman's attempt to minimize, and in effect trivialize, fault factors on
divorce as "rewarding virtue and punishing sin," the recognition of
fault factors when applied to serious marital misconduct, continues to
serve an important social, legal, moral, and public policy function
36
when it is properly regulated under applicable state law, 137 as only one
of the many relevant factors a trial court must consider in determining
131. Id. at 24-25.
132. Id. at 26. See also Fault in Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 786-97.
133. See, e.g., JAMES SCHOULER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE
& SEPARATION 1790-1877 (6th ed. 1921); MADDEN, supra note 4, at 264-87; JOYCE
GREEN ET AL., DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 15-27 (1986); UNDERSTANDING FAMILY
LAW, supra note 22, at 185-89, 249-50.
Professor Homer Clark discusses "how difficult it is to assign a single social
policy to alimony when it is awarded as an incident to absolute divorce," but that,
in addition to financial need, "alimony can also serve as compensation to the wife
[or the husband] for faithful service during marriage." CLARK, supra note 13, at
641-42. See also supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. Thus alimony, or
spousal support and maintenance on divorce, legitimately may be based on important
non-economic factors as well as financial factors. See, e.g., supra note 19 and
authority cited therein.
134. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 112-20, and accompanying text. See also Woodhouse, supra
note 99.
136. See generally supra notes 91-93, 97-99, 112-20 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., supra notes 99, 113, 119-20, and infra note 153.
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an appropriate spousal support award or the equitable division of marital
property on divorce.138 Professor Ellman next states that:
Inquiring into the cause of marital dissolution is different from inquiring
into the cause of chicken pox, or of a plumbing failure. The fundamental
problem is that the inquiry is one of morality, not science. Some individuals
tolerate their spouse's drunkenness or adultery and remain in their marriage.
Others may seek divorce if their spouse grows fat, or spends long hours
at the office. Is the divorce caused by one spouse's offensive conduct or
the other's unreasonable intolerance?
139
While it is true that some spouses may tolerate and forgive a serious
marital fault, such as adultery, based upon the family law principle of
138. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
139. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 25. Initially one may
question exactly how the cause of chicken pox or a plumbing failure has any relevance
at all to an inquiry into the cause of a marital dissolution, but perhaps this rather
strange illustration was meant to reinforce Professor Ellman's statement that "the
fundamental problem" of an inquiry into the cause of divorce "is one of morality,
not science." But query: Why is this reality so startling to Professor Ellman? It is a
well-recognized principle of American law in general, and American family law in a
majority of states, that state public policy may indeed consider "accepted standards
of right conduct," whether this concept of appropriate conduct is characterized in
terms of morality, responsibility, accountability, or fault. See, e.g., supra notes 92-
93, 97-99, 112-20, and accompanying text.
Is Professor Ellman suggesting that his financially based Principles of Family Disso-
lution Law brings a more "scientific" approach to the law of divorce or dissolution
of marriage, and therefore by definition it cannot include any nonfinancial or "nonscien-
tific" loss factors as well? With the exception of some early positivists such as John
Austin and Christopher Columbus Langdell, most legal scholars today reject the view
that law is a "science." See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR
THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (1863); Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of
Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Law Theory, 5 VT.
L. REV. 1 (1980). Instead, most twentieth-century legal scholars agree that complete
consistency and predictability of the law is rarely attainable in the real world, and that
the paramount concern of the law should not be logical consistency and uniformity,
but socially desirable consequences. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law
in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); KARL
LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM AND THEORY IN PRACTICE (1962); WILIFRED
RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968); ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982); GEORGE AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
It is true that Professor Ellman's defense of his Principles of Family Dissolution
Law has the laudable objective that these legal principles relating to spousal support
awards and division of marital property on divorce or dissolution of marriage should
be "consistent and predictable" in application. See infra notes 144-45 and accompa-
nying text. However, consistent and predictable laws that mandate complete uniformity
in application ignore important public policy considerations that frequently provide a
number of exceptions to any general rule. See, e.g., supra notes 80-99, 112-20, and
infra notes 146, 157-59, and accompanying text.
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condonation, "4 other spouses legitimately may not tolerate this serious
marital misconduct, such as a long-term adulterous relationship that
significantly and substantially contributes to the dissolution of the mar-
riage.' 4' Moreover, Professor Ellman's attempt to equate adultery in
a marital relationship with a spouse's obesity or the spending of long
hours at the office is likewise unpersuasive. Serious marital misconduct,
as defined by relevant state statutory and decisional authority, generally
includes adultery, cruelty, and desertion, 42 and attempting to equate
such serious marital misconduct with a spouse "growing fat" or
"spending long hours at the office" does little to substantiate Professor
Ellman's underlying argument.' 43
In sum, Professor Ellman's defense of his Principles of Family Disso-
lution Law is largely motivated by his underlying objectives that finan-
cially based legal principles, when applied to the division of marital
property and compensatory spousal support on divorce, should be "con-
sistent and predictable" in application, 144 and that any proposal "to
add a compensation-based fault rule to the Principles of Family Dissolu-
140. Condonation is generally defined as the conditional forgiveness of a marital
fault, with the understanding that the marital fault will not happen again. See, e.g.,
MADDEN, supra note 4, at 300-05; GREEN ET AL., supra note 133, at 40-44; UNDER-
STANDING FAMILY LAW, supra note 22, at 215.
141. See, e.g., O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
(affirming an unequal division of marital property favoring the wife and supported by
the negative nonmonetary contribution of the husband toward the marriage, based upon
his long-term adulterous relationships during the marriage which was the substantial
cause of the marriage dissolution). However, a short-term adulterous affair occurring
immediately prior to or after the parties' separation, when the dissolution of marriage
was caused by other relevant factors, should have little if any impact on the parties'
spousal support award or division of marital property. See, e.g., Smoot v. Smoot,
357 S.E.2d 728 (Va. 1987) (holding that husband's adultery was only the last unhappy
event in a marital relationship long since dissolved in fact, and therefore it was not
a relevant factor in awarding spousal support or the equitable division of marital
property); Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that multiple
acts of adultery did not have any adverse economic effects on the marriage, and that
the dissolution of the marriage was based on the cumulative effect of many other
factors); Gamer v. Gamer, 429 S.E.2d 618 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (similar holding).
142. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 644 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (adultery);
Day v. Day, 501 So. 2d 353 (Miss. 1987) (cruelty); Jamison v. Jamison, 352 S.E.2d
719 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (desertion). See generally supra note 133 and authority cited
therein.
143. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 17, at 641:
It seems that most people would at least agree that engaging in adultery, cruelty,
or desertion is not the sort of sharing behavior which marriage should have to
endure. In order to provide a disincentive for such behavior, there should be
concomitant post-divorce financial consequences for engaging in inappropriate
behavior.
See also supra notes 98 and 115 and accompanying text.
144. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 83 and 259.
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tion Law could therefore be understood as revisiting the fundamental
question of whether the law of marital dissolution should provide com-
pensation for nonfinancial losses." 45 However, legal consistency and
predictability can be bought at too high a price at the expense of judicial
discretion and legislative public policy, 46 especially in the absence of
a viable alternative remedy.
Soquery: What is so inherently wrong or inequitable in generally pro-
viding for financial loss on divorce, but with concomitant, nonfinancial
compensatory damages for serious or egregious marital misconduct as
well? If the institution of marriage still serves a valuable social, legal,
and economic function in contemporary American society, 147 and if other
no-fault remedial laws such as no-fault automobile insurance, no-fault
worker's compensation statutes, and no-fault strict products liability
laws all provide fault remedies for serious or egregious conduct, 148 then
why not a fault-based exception for serious or egregious marital miscon-
145. Id. at 27. But see supra notes 19, 91, 97-99, 113-20, 133 and authority cited
therein, recognizing that there are important nonfinancial loss factors in divorce or
dissolution of marriage as well.
See also Woodhouse, supra note 17, at 2561:
Law should reflect and comment on the meaning of human experiences. A fault-
blind scheme for balancing equities at divorce asserts that battering and bickering,
desertion and disenchantment, repeated infidelity and disappointing marital sex,
and the harms that flow from them, are qualitatively indistinguishable. In this tell-
ing, only financial relations are justiciable, and only money issues matter. Common
sense as well as social science studies of the effects of divorce suggest that this story
is neither useful as an ideal nor accurate as a reflection of people's experience.
146. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881):
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.
See also BENJAMIN CoRDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13
(1921):
One of the most fundamental social interests is that the law shall be uniform and
impartial.... But symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price.
Uniformity ceases to be good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The
social interest served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the
social interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare.
See also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948):
[Tihere are few areas of the law in black and white. The greys are dominant,
and even among them the shades are innumerable. For the eternal problem of
the law is one of making accommodations between conflicting interests. This is
why most legal problems end as questions of degree.
See generally supra note 139, and authority cited therein.
147. See generally supra Section II.
148. See generally supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
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duct in a no-fault divorce as well? Financially based factors and fault-
based factors on divorce or dissolution of marriage are not as mutually
exclusive as Professor Ellman suggests, and a significant number of state
legislatures and state courts presently take into account a spouse's inap-
propriate marital behavior and serious marital misconduct as defined and
regulated by appropriate statutory and decisional law. 149 A fault-based
remedy for serious marital misconduct therefore still serves a realistic,
viable, and socially defensible function in contemporary American di-
vorce law, especially since an independent tort-based remedy for serious
marital misconduct has proved to be an inadequate alternative. 150
2. "INHERENTLY LIMITLESS" JUDICIAL DIscRETION IF No FINDING OF
ECONOMIC HARM
Next, Professor Ellman severely criticizes the application of fault
factors on divorce since he believes the imposition of such behavioral
standards "must rely on trial court discretion" and "the moral stan-
dards by which blameworthy conduct will be identified and punished
will vary from judge to judge, as each judge necessarily relies on his
or her own vision of appropriate behavior in intimate relationships."
Such judicial discretion "seems inherently limitless if no finding of
economic harm to the claimant is required to justify the award or its
amount. -151
149. See, e.g., supra notes 97-99 and 114-21 and infra notes 153, 157-59 and
accompanying text.
150. See generally supra section III.C.3.
151. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 24. See also Fault in
Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 787. See also Principles of Family Dissolution
Law, at 69-70:
The traditional marital fault rule requires extraordinary reliance on trial court
discretion. Neither the standard of misconduct, nor its dollar consequences, are
much bounded by any rulb. While in principle the trial court's decision can be
reviewed for "abuse of discretion," reversals are rare .... The traditional fault
rule is thus inconsistent with a major theme of the Principles, an effort to improve
the consistency and predictability of trial court decisions.
On the other hand, Professor Ellman concedes that:
It is . . . not surprising that research studies find that trial court decisions on
alimony vary widely, even within the same jurisdiction. Some decisional variation
would be expected in even a perfect system, because trial courts must have discre-
tion in these matters to deal appropriately with factual variations that no statute
can comprehensively anticipate. ...
Id. at 6.
Professor Ellman believes that this variation "arises at least in part because trial courts
apply different principles as often as they face different facts." Id. However, Ellman does
not explain what these "different principles" entail, even though a substantial number of
jurisdictions do in fact limit judicial discretion to the application of certain enumerated
statutory factors in determining spousal support awards and the distribution of marital
property on divorce. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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In answer to Professor Ellman's concern regarding judicial discretion
in determining alimony awards and the division of marital property, fam-
ily court judges, from an equity heritage as triers of both fact and law,
do indeed possess broad judicial discretion in adjudicating family law
disputes, 15 2 but for Professor Ellman to characterize this judicial discre-
tion as "inherently limitless" is an unfortunate and an unwarranted char-
acterization when applied to the vast majority of family law disputes.
Judicial discretion involving spousal support awards and the division
of marital property on divorce is not as "limitless" as Professor Ellman
suggests. Judicial discretion in divorce matters necessarily is constrained
by the boundaries of those enumerated statutory factors which affect
spousal support awards and the division of marital property in most
states. 153 A court's judicial discretion in awarding spousal support or di-
viding marital property on divorce is also constrained by appellate review
for any erroneous application of the law by the trial court judge'54 or for
152. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 13, at 644-45:
It is axiomatic that the trial courts have wide discretion in determining the propriety
and the amount of alimony. The relevant factors are so numerous and their influ-
ence so incapable of precise evaluation that the trial court's decision in a particular
case will be affirmed unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion or is based upon
an erroneous application of legal principles.. . .As a result, claims for alimony are
won or lost in the trial courts, which have a correspondingly heavy responsibility to
deal fairly with [the] spouses in such cases. [Citations omitted.]
This wide judicial discretion also applies to the classification, valuation, and distribution
of marital property on divorce, Id. at 589-94, and to child custody determinations as
well:
In most states the award of [child] custody is held to be a matter for the discretion
of the trial court, to be upset on appeal only where an abuse of that discretion
is shown.... Certainly any appellate court should be reluctant to substitute its
judgment for that of a trial court in cases so entirely dependent upon particular
facts and the subtle differences to be drawn from those facts.
Id. at 796-97. Indeed, a parent's conduct and fitness are always relevant factors in
any child custody dispute. Id. at 797-806.
So query: Is Professor Ellman arguing for the abolition or the serious curtailment
of judicial discretion in other family law areas as well as those areas involving fault
factors as applied to spousal support and the division of marital property on divorce?
What significant parameters and underlying public policy rationales are involved in
abolishing or seriously curtailing judicial discretion in family law disputes generally?
153. See generally Elrod & Spector, supra note 11, at 804, 808, reporting that
thirty-eight states presently have explicit statutory factors to determine alimony or
spousal support on divorce, and thirty-six states presently have enumerated statutory
factors to determine the equitable distribution of marital or community property on
divorce; and Woodhouse, supra note 99, observing that a significant number of these
state statutory factors were enacted or amended subsequent to no-fault divorce legisla-
tion. See also supra notes 105 and 119 and authority cited therein.
154. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 1976); Benner v.
Benner, 377 A.2d 582 (Md. Ct. App. 1977); Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893
(Mich. 1992); Smoot v. Smoot, 357 S.E.2d 728 (Va. 1987). See also infra note 157
and the case authority cited therein.
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any abuse of judicial discretion. 55 Judicial discretion is also tempered
and constrained by the vast majority of family court judges who often
serve long and distinguished judicial careers on the bench, and who pos-
sess more depth, breadth, expertise, and day-to-day experience in at-
tempting to reach just and equitable results in family law disputes than,
say, many academic lawyers and legal scholars. 156
Professor Ellman's concern about "inherently limitless" judicial
discretion, however, is the fact that most fault jurisdictions now recog-
nize fault as only one of many statutory factors that must be taken into
consideration by the trial court judge in determining appropriate spousal
support and marital property division, 57 and, therefore, the current
judicial trend in many states today is that most judges tend to ignore
155. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 696 P.2d 1386 (Kan. 1985); Hogan v. Hogan, 651
S.W.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Quick v. Quick, 290 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. 1982);
Leonard v. Leonard, 552 A.2d 394 (Vt. 1988); Blank v. Blank, 389 S.E.2d 723 (Va.
Ct. App. 1990); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980).
156. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1889 (1988):
Do judges really need to be told [by legal scholars] how to interpret prior cases
[or legislative statutes] or how to construct a legal argument? That is the very
essence of their job, after all, and most people tend to believe that they can do
their job reasonably well on their own.
See also Woodhouse, supra note 117, at 2560:
I agree with the ALI's [Principles of Family Dissolution Law] description of the
complexities and challenges of the judging process, but not with the faint-hearted
conclusion that judges are incapable of trying cases that depend on assessing the
reasonableness of conduct in a given context or on calculating intangibles. We
have learned to calculate "goodwill" in a business enterprise, to place a dollar
value on an accident victim's pain, to judge corporate directors' fidelity in complex
takeover negotiations, and to calibrate punitive damages to deter misconduct in
many spheres. There is no reason why courts cannot undertake similar inquires
in the area of marital fault.
157. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1992) (holding that marital
misconduct is only one factor among many in establishing the division of marital property
on divorce and should not be dispositive. The trial courtjudge must consider all the statu-
tory factors, and since a marital property award was inequitable because disproportionate
weight was given to the wife's fault, the trial court decision was reversed and remanded
on appeal). See also Perlberger v. Perlberger, 626 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(holding that a court may consider marital misconduct with respect to alimony only in
the context of all relevant statutory factors); Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 (R.I. 1984)
(holding that the trial court judge must consider all of the enumerated statutory factors
when awarding spousal support and distributing marital property, not just marital mis-
conduct); Rexrode v. Rexrode, 339 S.E.2d 544 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a court
must considerall the statutory factors in making an equitable distribution award of marital
property or the award will be invalid); Woolley v. Woolley, 349 S.E.2d 422 (Va. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that the failure by the trial court judge to consider all the statutory
factors in determining spousal support would constitute reversible error).
See also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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or severely limit the ultimate effect of any fault-based factors on divorce
except in serious or egregious circumstances, 15 as even Professor Ell-
158. A random survey of various fault-based jurisdictions, for example, revealed the
following cases: Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S. E.2d 272 (Ga. 1976) (holding that where
a divorce is granted on a no-fault ground, alimony is authorized, but in such a case the
marital misconduct of the parties is not relevant to the amount of alimony to be awarded
and is also irrelevant to the division of marital property between the parties); Platt v.
Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court properly excluded
wife's testimony accusing husband of marital infidelity in determining the amount of
spousal support, since this would amount to an award greater than what state statutory
law legitimately allows); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that marital fault is only one of twelve statutory factors that a trial court must
consider in awarding alimony in a divorce action); Perlberger v. Perlberger, 626 A.2d
1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that the purpose of enacting no-fault divorce provi-
sions in addition to traditional fault provisions was to provide for the dissolution of mar-
riage in a manner which would keep pace with contemporary social realities. Under Penn-
sylvania law, therefore, marital misconduct may not be considered by the court in
determining the equitable distribution of marital property, but a court may consider mari-
tal misconduct in addition to other relevant factors in determining whether alimony is
necessary. In this case the trial court judge properly granted a divorce based on no-fault
grounds over the wife's objection, and a no-fault alimony award to the wife was based
upon the reasonable needs of the payee spouse and the payor's ability to pay); Tarro v.
Tarro, 485 A.2d 558 (R.I. 1984) (holding that a trial court judge must consider all the
statutory factors in awarding spousal support and equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty, and not just a single statutory factor such as the husband's alleged adultery. So where
the trial courtjudge applied all the statutory factors in this particular case, and reached the
conclusion that both parties contributed to the deterioration of the marriage, his decision
assigning marital property and awarding alimony without regard to fault was affirmed
on appeal.); Williams v. Williams, 415 S.E.2d 252 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
a divorce decree ordering husband to pay spousal support to wife was proper even if the
husband had sufficiently proved wife's adultery, since the court had the discretion to
grant a divorce based upon a one-year separation of the parties rather than on the wife's
adultery, and notwithstanding a finding of adultery, the court may award spousal sup-
port); Barnes v. Barnes, 428 S.E.2d 294 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the wife's
post-separation adultery would not bar her from receiving alimony since such adultery
had little to do with the deterioration of the marriage which had already been irretrievably
lost due to the mutual acts of the parties); Rexroad v. Rexroad, 414 S.E.2d 457 (W.Va.
1992) (holding that although fault factors may affect an award of alimony, there was no
finding in this particular case that such fault was a contributing factor to the deterioration
of the marriage as required by state statute in order for fault to be considered in determin-
ing alimony); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that a trial court judge,
in his or her discretion, may refuse to hear evidence of adultery or other fault relating
to the division of marital property).
The judicial application of relevant state statutory criteria to these particular fact
situations therefore does not appear to be as "inflexible" or as "vague" as Professor
Ellman suggests. See Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 24.
Professor ElIman, however, does cite the case of Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d
814 (Wyo. 1984), as an example of how trial court discretion in assigning liability to
nontortious conduct allegedly creates "much mischief" in the application of'"unarticu-
lated and effectively unreviewable standards of blameworthiness." Id. at 26. Professor
Ellman describes the Grosskopf decision as one where "a spouse may be held at fault
for the breakup of the marriage because she prefers to live in a more urban setting
than is available in the forum state preferred by her husband." Id. at 26 n.33.
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man apparently concedes. 159 In short, fault-based statutory factors for
the determination of spousal support or the division of marital property
on divorce appear to be rarely applied by most judges unless there is
evidence of serious or egregious marital misconduct.
3. IS A SEPARATE TORT ACTION A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY?
Professor Ellman finally argues that compensation for nonfinancial
loss imposed by the other spouse's serious marital misconduct is better
left to a separate tort law remedy:
[T]he potentially valid functions of a fault principle are better served by
the tort and criminal law, and attempting to serve them through a [divorce
Professor Ellman's characterization of the relevant facts in Grosskopf, however,
is too simplistic. The facts were that Mrs. Grosskopf was insistent that the parties
move from Cody, Wyoming, to Wisconsin where her family and relatives resided.
She wanted her husband to quit his job, she wanted him to sell their new home,
and she decided to practice celibacy during the last two years of their marriage.
There were numerous occasions when the wife packed her car, determined to leave
the husband. On one occasion, the husband returned to an empty house to discover
a note stating that she was moving to Montana with the children. Ultimately, the
wife took the children out of school and permanently moved to Wisconsin. 677
P.2d at 818. The Grosskopf court held with a majority of state courts "that the
enactment of a no-fault divorce statute which does no more than provide no-fault
grounds on divorce, does not modify the traditional, existing grounds for determin-
ing child custody, support, alimony, attorneys fees, and the division of property."
677 P.2d at 819. Arguably, then, Mrs. Grosskopf's marital misconduct could have
included elements of desertion, cruelty, or both, which substantially contributed
to the breakdown of the marriage, and which were only one of a number of relevant
factors that the trial court judge properly considered in determining spousal support
or division of marital property on divorce.
Equally important in the Grosskopfcase was the Wyoming Supreme Court's discus-
sion of another important Wyoming precedent:
In Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707 [at 715] (Wyo. 1980), we held that the trial court
might refuse to hear testimony concerning fault in the circumstances of that particu-
lar case....
Paul v. Paul stands for the principle that in certain circumstances the court
may, in its discretion, refuse to hear evidence of fault; and that, in any event,
such evidence may not be considered by the court to punish one of the parties,
but only to insure that the property division is just and equitable under all the
facts and circumstances of the case.
The Grosskopf decision therefore does not appear to be as "unarticulated" or as
"unreviewable" as Professor Ellman suggests, even though Grosskopf may appear
to be an exception to the general rule of judicial restraint in applying fault-based factors
to spousal support awards or the division of marital property.
159. See, e.g., Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 18: "In
some [full fault] states, authoritative appellate decisions have on occasion attempted
to describe the range of misconduct that trial courts should consider, or suggest restraint
in the weight to be accorded [to marital] misconduct." Id. However, appellate cases
in a number of fault states suggest that such judicial restraint may now constitute the
general rule rather than the exception, as Professor Ellman apparently believes. See
notes supra 153, 157-58 and accompanying text.
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based] fault rule risks serious distortions in the resolution of the dissolution
action . . . [and] compensation for the non-financial losses imposed by the
other spouse's battery or emotional abuse, is better left to tort law ...
Where valid compensation claims arise, whether for physical violence or
emotional abuse, the tort law provides principles to measure and satisfy
them, and to determine when they are too stale to entertain .... '60
Professor Ellman further posits that there are two possibilities where
compensation for harm caused by the wrongful conduct of a spouse
could be actionable, and that each has a tort analog:
1. Compensation for emotional losses arising from the other spouse's mis-
conduct. (Intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress) [and] 2.
Compensation for the pain and suffering arising from the other's miscon-
duct. (General damages in battery or assault actions)
In short, a fault rule would serve compensation functions that may already
be served by tort law. Such duplication is inadvisable. There is no reason
to reinvent compensation principles under the rubric of fault adjudications,
nor to incorporate tort principles into divorce adjudications ... 161
This author agrees with Professor Ellman that there is "no reason
to reinvent compensation principles under the rubric of fault adjudica-
Professor Ellman does note, however, that:
Categorization of state law is also complicated by the variation among the fault
states in their definition of the relevant misconduct and the financial issues to
which it applies. Some allow consideration of only specified forms of misconduct;
some leave the matter to trial court discretion but attempt to contain its exercise
through rules that in general terms limit the kind of conduct that may be considered.
It is particularly difficult to characterize the law of this last group because of the
hortatory nature of governing authority. Perhaps the problem is even greater.
Experienced practitioners in some states have suggested that trial courts do not
always honor the "official" limitations on consideration of fault, while those
from other states suggest that their courts are rarely willing to consider evidence
of misconduct even though technically relevant under local law. It is difficult to
make use of such anecdotal reports of discrepancies between formal law governing
fault and a jurisdiction's actual practice.
Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 15-16.
So query: In the absence of objective empirical evidence to the contrary, and with
a number of recent cases applying a great deal of judicial restraint in the application
of relevant fault factors as only one of a number of statutory factors that a judge must
consider in any divorce proceeding, how can Professor EUman reasonably assume
that such judicial discretion is "inherently limitless"? Without supporting empirical
evidence, how can he reasonably argue that judicial discretion ought to be seriously
curtailed? See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
160. Fault in Modem Divorce Law, supra note 19, at 807-08. A criminal law
statute, such as a spousal rape or domestic violence statute, may punish the wrongdoer
under state criminal law sanctions, but it does not necessarily compensate the injured
spouse. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (1981); State v.
Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847 (Va.
1984).
161. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 28.
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tions," but for an entirely different reason. Fault adjudication on di-
vorce already exists in a majority of American states today, based upon
an important underlying state public policy rationale with respect to
serious marital misconduct, 62 so fault adjudication on divorce, in a
majority of states at least, need not be "reinvented."
I cannot agree, however, with Professor Ellman's attempt to char-
acterize nonfinancial fault-based compensatory remedies only in
terms of assault and battery, or in terms of tortious infliction of
emotional distress. To be sure, serious marital misconduct under
the concept of marital cruelty might indeed include assault and bat-
tery and the infliction of emotional distress, as well as spousal abuse,
domestic violence, and attempted murder. 63 But serious marital mis-
conduct is not necessarily limited solely to physical or mental cruelty,
since adultery that substantially contributes to the dissolution of a
marriage is also recognized as a relevant fault-based factor in a sub-
stantial number of states as well.'64 Yet Professor Ellman concedes
that emotional distress actions based upon a spouse's adultery gener-
ally are not actionable in an independent tort action. 65 Likewise, a
number of marital intentional infliction of emotional distress cases
brought under independent tort actions have not been successful,
since the marital misconduct was not deemed to be "outrageous"
enough based upon applicable tort law principles.'66
Another major problem with Professor Ellman's advocacy of an
independent tort action for serious marital misconduct is that separate
marital tort claims would foster a costly, onerous, and largely unneces-
sary multiplicity of lawsuits, especially for injured spouses of modest
means; and the troubling question of whether or not a tort claim should
162. See supra notes 97-99, 112-120, 153-59 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1986); In re Marriage of
Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005 (Kan. 1990); Brancovenanu v. Brancovenanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d
86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); In re Marriage of Brabec, 510 N.W.2d 752 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993). But see contra supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1 (1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH.
§ 208-34 (West 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1, -16.3 (1985); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3701(14) (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101-d(1)(k) (1996); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.1, -107.3 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1996).
See also supra notes 112-20, 133 and accompanying text.
165. See Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 32 n.43, citing
Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599
A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993); Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
166. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 31-34. See, e.g.,
Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 901 P.2d 986 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); and Dye v. Gainey, 463
S.E.2d 97 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
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be joined in a divorce action, and under what applicable procedural
rules, continues to trouble many state courts. As Professor Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse observes:
Tort claims for marital misconduct have several drawbacks .... Because
they are treated with suspicion as neither divorce claims nor classic forms
of tort, tort remedies for spousal misconduct are often denied or restricted
by courts accustomed to no-fault ideology of marriage dissolution. They
raise tricky questions of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the right to a
jury trial, overlapping recoveries, and limitations on damages. These issues
.. . currently must be resolved by judges addressing individual cases in a
piecemeal fashion and confined to the analytical structure of tort laws.167
However, Professor Ellman offers no persuasive answers to remedy
these very serious substantive and procedural issues involved in bring-
ing a separate tort action for serious marital misconduct. Instead, Pro-
fessor Ellman concludes:
Reliance on the tort system to provide a satisfactory result where one
spouse's wrongful conduct has injured the other requires attention to rules
establishing the relationship between inter spousal tort claims and the finan-
cial remedies available in an action for marital dissolution. . . . [I]t may
be that further attention to this matter is necessary. These questions, how-
ever, are largely procedural in nature, and are not within the scope of [these
Principles of Family Dissolution Law].168
Thus, Professor Ellman's argument that fault factors no longer should
play any role in determining spousal support awards or the division
of marital property on divorce are unconvincing and unpersuasive for
a number of reasons. First, Ellman's attempt to conceptually recharac-
terize marital fault in tort and criminal law terminology is doubly inap-
propriate since the underlying concept of marital fault, based upon
serious marital misconduct, has long been recognized as an important
principle of American family law separate and apart from any tort law
or criminal law remedy; and a majority of American states, therefore,
continue to consider fault factors on divorce as serving an important
social, economic, moral, and public policy function as only one of the
167. Woodhouse, supra note 115, at 2566. See also Elrod & Spector, supra note
11, at 800-02 (observing that problems concerning the proper resolution of marital
tort issues that arise in the divorce process "continue to trouble the courts").
168. Principles of Family Dissolution Law, supra note 19, at 50. In effect, then,
Professor Ellman advocates an independent tort action for serious marital misconduct
that is both costly and duplicative, and that does not provide an adequate remedy for
all substantive claims of serious marital misconduct. This raises a number of largely
unresolved procedural issues as to exactly how such an independent tort action should
be brought. Thus, if these serious substantive and procedural issues are not within the
scope of the Principles of Family Dissolution Law, they arguably ought to be.
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many relevant factors that a trial court judge must properly consider
in determining an appropriate award. Professor Ellman's underlying
objective in crafting "consistent and predictable" financial loss princi-
ples in the Principles of Family Dissolution Law seriously underesti-
mates the importance of this essential nonfinancial fault factor.' 69 Sec-
ond, Professor Ellman offers no persuasive evidence in support of his
assertion that judicial discretion in applying fault factors on divorce is
"inherently limitless" when the opposite may in fact be true that judges
today are applying a great deal of judicial restraint in such cases, and
are further constrained in their judicial discretion by a number of enu-
merated legislative factors, and by appellate review. 1 70 Finally, a sepa-
rate tort-based remedy for serious marital misconduct fails to provide
a realistic alternative remedy to fault-based divorce compensation for
a number of important substantive and procedural reasons. 171
IV. Conclusion
Marriage continues to serve an important social, economic, and legal
function in contemporary American society based upon its invaluable
role in the raising and socialization of children and by providing im-
portant economic and social support to its family members. Thus, any
serious marital misconduct or egregious marital fault that substantially
contributes to the breakdown of marriage is still properly considered
in a majority of American states as an important factor on divorce,
almost thirty years after the so-called no-fault divorce revolution. This
is because most states have incorporated no-fault divorce grounds and
remedies into their traditional fault-based legal framework, rather than
totally substituting one system for the other. Thus, few states today
totally ignore fault as one of the many factors that ajudge must consider
in determining spousal support awards or the division of marital prop-
erty on divorce.
Various commentators, including Professor Ira Ellman, have argued
for the total abolition of all fault-based factors on divorce in favor of
more consistent and predictable no-fault financial loss principles. These
commentators, however, ignore the crucial fact that important nonfi-
nancial losses occur on divorce as well as financial losses, including
the serious or egregious marital misconduct of a spouse that substan-
tially causes the marital breakdown.
169. See supra notes 133-38, 140-50 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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The concern of some no-fault commentators that fault-based factors,
when applied to the allocation of spousal support or the division of
marital property on divorce, in effect "rewards virtue and punishes
sin," seriously underestimates and belittles a state's strong public policy
goal of holding a spouse legally accountable and responsible for his
or her serious marital misconduct. A concern that judicial discretion
is "inherently limitless," if no finding of economic harm is required,
is likewise unpersuasive, and has yet to be clearly demonstrated. On
the contrary, judicial discretion in most divorce cases today is
constrained by the application of a number of statutory factors relating
to spousal support awards and the division of marital property on di-
vorce that a judge must properly consider. Judicial discretion is also
tempered and constrained by the trial court judge's own day-to-day
expertise and experience in divorce matters. Judicial discretion is fur-
ther constrained by appellate review whenever a trial court judge fails
to apply the correct statutory or decisional law, or whenever a trial
court judge abuses his or her judicial discretion.
Equally important, the fact that most jurisdictions now recognize
marital fault as only one of many statutory factors that must be consid-
ered by a trial court judge in determining spousal support or the division
of marital property on divorce illustrates the current judicial trend in
many states today that most judges tend to ignore or severely restrict
the ultimate effect of any fault-based factor except in the most serious
or egregious of cases. Thus, financially based compensation on divorce
is not necessarily incompatible with fault-based compensation for seri-
ous marital misconduct since other "no-fault" remedial laws, including
no-fault automobile insurance, no-fault worker's compensation stat-
utes, and no-fault strict products liability laws, also provide fault-based
compensation and fault-based remedies for serious or egregious con-
duct. Finally, separate tort-based compensation as a proposed alterna-
tive remedy for serious marital misconduct has proven to be an inade-
quate remedy for a number of substantive and procedural reasons.
In conclusion, fault-based factors in no-fault divorce continue to
serve a useful and viable moral, social, economic, and legal purpose
in contemporary American society. Fault-based statutory factors for
determining spousal support awards or for determining the distribution
of marital property on divorce, therefore, should not be abolished or
abrogated in those states that continue to recognize and properly utilize
these factors, without clear and compelling evidence that fault-based
factors do not in fact serve an important underlying moral, social,
economic, and public policy function. At a time when public policy
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studies are focusing on strengthening marital relationships and the nu-
clear family in America, and at a time when fault-based factors on
divorce or dissolution of marriage are being seriously reassessed by a
number of commentators, courts, and legislators, it makes no sense at
all to totally abolish these fault factors, largely based on questionable
arguments and unsubstantiated anecdotal evidence, without a clear and
compelling reason to do so, especially in the absence of any viable
alternative remedy for serious marital misconduct.
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